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Our cases have not yet considered whether, and if so to what extent,
the First Amendment protects . . . instructional speech.
—Justice John Paul Stevens

†

INTRODUCTION
This is the story of Jack and the jackpot. In July 2010, an information
security researcher named Barnaby Jack1 caused an Automated Teller
Machine (ATM) to spew pretend money 2 into an uproariously cheering
audience of “hackers” 3 at DEF CON, a leading information security

† Statement of Justice Stevens in Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002), regarding the
Court’s refusal to review a Ninth Circuit decision reversing a conviction under an Arizona law that
prohibits advising gang members on gang policy and practices. No Supreme Court case squarely
addresses instructional speech.
1
Barnaby Jack, Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines Redux, DEF CON, http://www.defcon.org/
html/defcon-18/dc-18-speakers.html#Jack (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
2
Jack’s presentation at DEF CON was his second of the week; he had previously presented this
research at Black Hat 2010 a few days prior. See Robert McMillan, Barnaby Jack Hits ATM Jackpot at
Black Hat, COMPUTERWORLD (July 28, 2010, 9:08 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9179844/Barnaby_Jack_hits_ATM_jackpot_at_Black_Hat (describing Jack’s presentation at Black Hat,
which he repeated at DEF CON). Word of the dramatic nature of the presentation had spread, and the
audience at DEF CON was filled with hundreds of attendees. See Dean Takahashi, Researcher Shows
How to Hack ATMs with “Dillinger” Tool, VENTUREBEAT (July 28, 2010, 2:27 PM), http://venture
beat.com/2010/07/28/researcher-shows-how-to-hack-atms-with-dillinger-tool/.
3
The audience included a motley assortment of individuals, including the author of this Article,
who attends the conference annually. For a description of information security conference attendees,
see, for example, Official DEF CON FAQ v0.95, DEF CON, http://www.defcon.org/html/links/dcfaq/dc-faq.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
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conference held annually in Las Vegas. 4 Although his ability to succeed in
this “exploit”—or act of information security compromise—demonstrated
his skill as a security researcher, his ability to control the ATM in this
manner existed not only because of his hacking prowess, but also because
of flaws in the way that the software running the ATM had been coded.5
Step by step, Jack demonstrated the vulnerabilities in the build of the
machine to the audience. He also highlighted critical problems in physical
security around the machine: the ATM was available for purchase and
delivery on eBay, a key circumstance that had facilitated the months of
code analysis (from the comfort of Jack’s own home) and had led him to
select that particular ATM.6
This is also the story of the First Amendment and instructional speech,
or, what Professor Martin Redish has termed “informational” speech 7—
speech that conveys factual information that can be repurposed for crime. 8
The idea of someone explaining how to cause a potentially improperly
programmed ATM to eject—or, as the industry calls it, “jackpot” 9—money
will viscerally strike many legal academics and judges as speech that
brazenly advocates criminality. They will question the social value of such
speech and ask whether it treads into the territory of unprotected speech
under the First Amendment. Meanwhile, this initial legal instinct sits
diametrically opposed to the dominant thinking in the burgeoning
information security research community: the default assumption among
seasoned researchers and ingénues alike is one of full First Amendment
protection for this type of speech. In reality, the doctrinal First Amendment
truth lies somewhere in the middle: the law is unclear. 10 The Supreme
Court has never expressly addressed the doctrinal question.
Building on the work of Professor Redish, this Article grapples with
the legally undertheorized but critically important doctrinal tensions around
the First Amendment status of informational speech—a doctrinal question

4
See generally DEF CON, http://www.defcon.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (discussing the
conferences and archiving information about them).
5
See McMillan, supra note 2.
6
See Mike Cassidy, Hacker Breaks Into ATMs for Good, Not Evil, PHYS.ORG (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://phys.org/news203844123.html.
7
See Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the
McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 80 (2004).
8
In other words, informational speech does not refer to mere voicing of opinion that may, for
example, contain violent hyperbole. Instead, it refers to speech that is potentially directly usable by a
criminal.
9
See, e.g., Henry Schwarz, Black Hatted, HENRY SCHWARZ’S ATM & EFT-POS SECURITY BLOG,
http://henryschwarz.blogspot.com/2012/06/black-hatted.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
10
Meanwhile, a reasonable consumer potentially might be most interested in whether the
vulnerability was ever fixed. (It was.) Ryan Naraine, ATM Makers Patch Black Hat Cash-Dispensing
Flaw, ZDNET (Aug. 23, 2010, 12:14 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/atm-makers-patchblack-hat-cash-dispensing-flaw/7210.
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flagged but left unresolved by the Supreme Court. 11 Specifically, this
Article examines the broader dynamics of informational speech through a
case study of what I term “vulnerability speech”—informational speech
that identifies a potentially critical flaw in a technological system or
product but also indirectly potentially facilitates criminality. Technology
advancements further complicate the doctrinal tensions the Court has left
unresolved regarding informational speech. Informational speech, such as
vulnerability speech, now blends traditional modes of informational speech
with a second bundle of doctrinally unresolved First Amendment issues—
those around code speech. 12
This Article offers a novel technology-neutral First Amendment
paradigm for addressing informational speech—a “repurposed speech
scale.” Part I introduces the doctrinal tensions around informational speech
as it intermingles with the doctrinal tensions around code speech. Part II
explores the case study of vulnerability speech and offers a construction of
value for informational speech built around possible positive incidental
effects and scarcity. Part III introduces the “repurposed speech scale,” an
approach that builds on prior First Amendment scholarship, in particular
the work of Professor Martin Redish. The repurposed speech scale creates a
protected space for discussion of social policy matters, even when risks of
significant nonspeech harms may result. Thus, it offers a contextual
approach to informational speech that assists in determining whether a
speaker’s intent is salutary or criminal: it requires reasonable care from the
speaker in his selection of time, place, and manner for his speech in order
for his speech to be deemed fully protected under the First Amendment.13
Specifically, the scale identifies four factors: (1) the asserted goal of the
speaker in his speech, (2) the reputation of the forum, (3) the scarcity of the

11

See Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J.) (statement regarding the Court’s
refusal to review a Ninth Circuit decision reversing a conviction under an Arizona law that prohibits
advising gang members on gang policy and practices).
12
Vulnerability speech is not the only technology-driven context that highlights the open First
Amendment questions around informational speech. For example, informational speech questions
similarly arise with respect to instructions and code for 3D printers that enable the printers to create
restricted or regulated products such as guns and other weapons. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Here’s
What It Looks Like to Fire a (Partly) 3D-Printed Gun (Video), FORBES (Dec. 3, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/12/03/heres-what-it-looks-like-to-fire-a-partly-3d-printedgun-video/. Instructional speech questions also arise with respect to postings made by speakers in
forums such as 4chan known to be frequented by hacktivists. See, e.g., Annemarie Dooling, 4chan 101:
Message Boards for Non-Hacktivists, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2011, 5:36 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/02/4chan-101-message-boards-_n_943909.html.
13
For a discussion of contextual integrity, see generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT (2010), urging a broader approach to privacy that considers norms in various social contexts,
rather than the contemporary approach of merely distinguishing between the public and private spheres.
A finding of protection for speech under the First Amendment can immunize the speaker from criminal
prosecution or civil suit. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir.
1987).
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information contributed, and (4) the extent of risk mitigation by the
speaker. Finally, applying the repurposed speech scale to the case study of
vulnerability speech, two scenarios are likely to trigger the need for the
scale. First, the repurposed speech scale would, for example, circumscribe
any congressional attempts to prohibit vulnerability disclosure in its
entirety. Second, the repurposed speech scale offers methodology for an
intent analysis in cases where vulnerability researchers or resellers are
charged with criminal offenses, including aiding and abetting acts of
computer intrusion, conspiracy, economic espionage, and possibly treason.
I.

INFORMATIONAL SPEECH 2.0: UNLAWFUL ADVOCACY PLUS
CODE SPEECH
Let us return to Jack and the jackpot. Jack’s presentation clearly falls
into the category of informational speech: the knowledge Jack shared
could, in theory, be repurposed by criminals. To complicate matters further,
in the course of Jack’s DEF CON presentation, Jack not only verbally
explained each step of the compromise of the ATM, but he also displayed
written information and used code as part of both the demonstration and the
compromise itself.14 As Jack’s ATM-vulnerability disclosure demonstrates,
today’s informational speech intermingles both code and noncode elements
into a single context. Yet, Jack’s speech also happened not only in real
time, but also in various “time-shifted” 15 multimedia formats: Jack’s
presentation was extensively covered by press and is still available for
viewing on YouTube years later. 16 In other words, in order to craft a
successful First Amendment approach to informational speech, the
precedent and theory around unlawful advocacy and informational speech
must be informed by the precedent and theory around code speech and vice
versa. Yet, both of these areas of First Amendment jurisprudence suffer
from doctrinal holes.
A. Unlawful Advocacy and Informational Speech
Although noted First Amendment scholars have voiced doubts
regarding the doctrinal fit, 17 instructional or informational speech
presumptively arises as a doctrinal branch of incitement and unlawful
advocacy. 18 The exact doctrinal contours around informational speech
14

See McMillan, supra note 2.
The term “time-shifting” arises out of the intellectual property context and means a delayed use.
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
16
E.g., SecurityWeek, SecurityWeek.Com—Barnaby Jack Hacks ATM at Black Hat, YOUTUBE
(July 28, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwMuMSPW3bU.
17
See, e.g., Redish, supra note 7, at 89‒93; Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1095, 1185‒92 (2005).
18
For a discussion of incitement, see, for example, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107‒08 (1973)
(per curiam), which explains that “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later” does not constitute incitement
15
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remain a mystery, however; the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed instructional or informational speech and has declined to review
the issue when an opportunity has arisen. 19 Also, while some lower courts
have already considered the issue, 20 an analysis of these decisions does not
provide clear guidance.
Perhaps the most notorious case in this legal space is Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises, Inc. 21 In Rice, the Fourth Circuit refused to use the First
Amendment as a shield to protect a publisher from a suit in tort filed by the
survivors of three individuals murdered by a contract killer who used the
publisher’s books to plan and carry out the killings. 22 The publisher,
Paladin, argued that the books were protected by the First Amendment. 23
Paladin stipulated that although it had no specific knowledge that the killer
planned to commit a crime, it knew while publishing, marketing, and
distributing the two books that the publications would be used by criminals
to commit murder and that this use was consistent with its intent. 24
In contrast to Rice, in another situation involving wrongful death, sits
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., where the Fifth Circuit shielded Hustler
Magazine from liability in connection with a suit by the mother of a reader
who had died during an act of autoerotic asphyxiation after reading a
through an imminent threat under the three-part test developed by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). According to Professor Kent Greenawalt, the test’s
language appears to require “a serious evil, a substantial likelihood that speech will cause the evil, and a
close temporal nexus between speech and evil.” Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 5 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 645, 696 (1980).
19
Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J.); see also, e.g., United States v.
Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1121, 1123 (5th Cir.) (applying the clear and present danger test to convict
black militants for teaching explosive assembly in preparation for “the coming revolution”), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
20
For example, in most circuits, instructions regarding tax evasion are usually deemed by courts to
constitute unprotected speech, providing grounds for a speaker’s conviction on grounds of aiding and
abetting tax fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that tax evasion instructions must rise to the level of incitement under Brandenburg to constitute aiding
and abetting); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir. 1978) (finding that describing how
to cheat on taxes is incitement, disregarding the time-sensitivity factor identified in other case law).
Similarly, in United States v. Barnett, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of a defendant who sold
drug-making instructions through a mail exchange. Despite never having personal contact with the
principal, furnishing instructions was sufficient to make the defendant criminally responsible for aiding
and abetting. 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982).
21
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). Professor Redish argues that the case was wrongly decided. See
Redish, supra note 7, at 65–66, 93.
22
128 F.3d at 267.
23
See id. at 241‒43.
24
This stipulation may have single-handedly proven fatal to Paladin’s case. Redish argues that Rice
was wrongly decided and that the court’s concern appeared to a significant part to have been the
manual’s purely persuasive value. “Thus, by parsing the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Rice, one can see
that improper persuasional concerns, rather than the communication of otherwise publicly inaccessible
information, underlay the court’s conclusion that the manual was to be denied First Amendment
protection.” Redish, supra note 7, at 93.
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detailed description of its charms in the periodical. 25 However, unlike in
Rice, intent was not stipulated and the court noted the presence of
meaningful cautionary language in the article, language that warned readers
not to attempt the practice and therefore potentially signaled lack of
advocacy of the practice.26 Although an intent analysis may offer a
modicum of guidance in distinguishing these cases, much doctrinal
uncertainty remains with respect to informational speech and its First
Amendment status.
Scholarship is similarly divided on the question of protection for
instructional speech, as well as the appropriateness of using incitement
analysis in instructional speech cases. Professor Thomas Emerson has
argued that advice and persuasion is protected, but instructions or
preparations would not be. 27 Meanwhile, Professor Laurence Tribe has
stated that “law need not treat differently the crime of one man who sells a
bomb to terrorists and that of another who publishes an instruction manual
for terrorists on how to build their own bombs out of old Volkswagen
parts.” 28 Professor Eugene Volokh, on the other hand, has argued that these
instructional speech cases—which he terms “crime-facilitating speech” 29—
“are not incitement cases” because the speech is not persuading hearers to
commit bad acts; it simply gives people information that assists in
criminality. 30 Specifically, he argues that:
[C]rime-facilitating speech ought to be constitutionally protected unless
(1) it’s said to a person or a small group of people when the speaker knows
these few listeners are likely to use the information for criminal purposes,
(2) it’s within one of the few classes of speech that has almost no noncriminal
value, or (3) it can cause extraordinarily serious harm (on the order of a
nuclear attack or a plague) even when it’s also valuable for lawful purposes. 31

Perhaps the most developed treatment of instructional or informational
speech appears in the work of Professor Martin Redish. Redish argues that
25
814 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding First Amendment protection for—and thus no
criminal or civil liability in connection with—the publication of an article detailing the practice of
autoerotic asphyxiation, despite the reader’s death).
26
Hustler’s meaningful cautionary language stated: “Hustler emphasizes the often-fatal dangers of
the practice of ‘auto-erotic asphyxia,’ and recommends that readers seeking unique forms of sexual
release DO NOT ATTEMPT this method. The facts are presented here solely for an educational
purpose.” Id. at 1018.
27
See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 75 (1970).
28
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (2d ed. 1988).
29
Volokh defines crime-facilitating speech as: “(1) any communication that, (2) intentionally or
not, (3) conveys information that (4) makes it easier or safer for some listeners or readers (a) to commit
crimes, torts, acts of war (or other acts by foreign nations that would be crimes if done by individuals),
or suicide, or (b) to get away with committing such acts.” Volokh, supra note 17, at 1103 (footnote
omitted).
30
See id. at 1102.
31
Id. at 1106.
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none of the currently available doctrinal conceptual approaches32 to
unlawful advocacy, “standing alone, provides an adequate resolution of the
competing interests in free expression and national security.” 33
Conceptually, Redish carves out informational speech from unlawful
advocacy, and in doing so, he offers a novel framework for informational
speech. 34 He highlights both the social importance of a speech-protective
approach to informational speech, but he adopts a more balanced approach
than Volokh, recognizing possible national security risks from unfettered
informational speech in certain contexts.
Redish explains informational speech and how its treatment should
differ from that applied to unlawful advocacy:
Although as a traditional matter unlawful advocacy is assumed to seek to
persuade others to take illegal actions, on occasion speech that does no more
than inform can reasonably be thought to proximately lead to unlawful
conduct.
....

32
Redish identifies four fundamental approaches to unlawful advocacy regulation. First,
“definitional absolutism,” which protects under the banner of the First Amendment all activity that is
“included within the definition of ‘speech,’ as opposed to non-expressive conduct.” Second,
“categorical balancing,” which balances various interests by determining specific categories of activity
that are worthy of protection prior to a legislative or judicial challenge. Third, “deferential balancing,”
where a reviewing court generally defers to legislative or executive determinations regarding whether
particular expression advocating unlawful conduct will be regulated, suppressed, or punished. Fourth,
“speech-protective balancing,” which attempts to “balance competing interests in maintaining free and
open expression on the one hand and in assuring security and preventing violence on the other hand,”
while including a “strong presumption in favor of the constitutional protection of speech.” Redish,
supra note 7, at 17.
33
Id. at 16. Redish argues that “[t]he best solution to the unlawful advocacy conundrum is found in
an approach that selectively synthesizes elements of several of the previously proffered scholarly
theories of unlawful advocacy regulation, to form a radically different conceptual and doctrinal
approach to the unlawful advocacy conundrum.” Id. at 17.
34
Redish proposes a “selective categorization” model that “would pick and choose among the
various models, depending upon an ex ante categorical division among different groupings of factual
circumstances.” Id. at 80. He recognizes four groupings: “(1) ‘confined’ unlawful advocacy;
(2) ‘unconfined’ unlawful advocacy; (3) speech-acts; and (4) informational speech.” Id. Redish also
explains that:
[D]irectly coercive expression has no place under the First Amendment’s umbrella. . . . On a
purely definitional level, we have already seen that the mere fact that words are used does not
automatically render those words protected expression. . . . [O]ne can imagine a case where an
individual issues the command, “fire,” to a firing squad poised to commit an execution. In this
case, the particular word used does make a difference, yet again it is difficult to characterize this
verbal effort as expression. The word is so intertwined with the action that it effectively becomes
part of the action. Similarly, where words are used in a directly coercive manner, as in the case of
blackmail or threats, it is appropriate to exclude those superficially expressive acts from the
definition of speech.
....
. . . [A]t some point, a synthesis of the speaker’s intent and the listener’s reaction of fear or
coercion will necessarily justify application of a coercive speech exception.
Id. at 85–87.
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. . . [I]t makes sense to treat informational expression . . . differently from
the way purely persuasive advocacy is treated. . . . The focus should, for the
most part, be on a synthesis of four factors: (1) the likelihood that
communication of the information will lead to an illegal activity; (2) the
potential harmfulness of the behavior to which the information is likely to
lead; (3) the extent to which the public already possesses access to the
information through alternative means; and (4) the potential value to the
public of the revealed information. Each consideration is to be deemed a
necessary condition to justify the removal of constitutional protection. 35

It is this theoretical building block upon which the sections that follow
rest. 36 But due to technological advancements, Redish’s insightful approach
begins to strain. As the following Parts of this Article demonstrate, mixedmedia or technology-assisted informational speech—particularly
vulnerability speech—exacerbates the preexisting First Amendment
doctrinal holes concerning informational speech. They are now
compounded with another set of doctrinal First Amendment holes—those
around code speech.
B. Informational Speech Meets Code Speech
As the example of Jack’s informational speech in the introduction
demonstrates, new media—including the Internet and computer code—
have become intertwined with the informational speech of the past.
Therefore, it becomes essential to inform any successful doctrinal approach
to informational speech with an understanding of the dynamics of new
media. In other words, an informational speech framework should strive to
35
Id. at 89‒90. Redish further explains the third factor: “Indeed, it is arguable that the third
criterion should be deemed satisfied only when the information is contained in documents classified as
secret by the government.” Id. at 90. Regarding the fourth factor, Redish concedes that:
Inclusion of the fourth factor—the potential value of the revealed information—is admittedly
a highly risky strategy. Normally, it is not for the courts to gradate First Amendment protection
o[n] the basis of their subjective judgments of the value of regulated speech. In the context of
informational expression regulation, however, inclusion of the value consideration should serve
only as a one-way ratchet: [a court considers the fourth factor] if, and only if, application of the
first three factors would lead to the validation of speech regulation. In such a situation, reference
to the fourth factor could serve as a possible safety valve to constitutionally insulate the
expression from suppression. For example, in the so-called Pentagon Papers case, . . . absent this
fourth factor a court could conceivably have held the suppression unconstitutional, solely on the
grounds that the previously classified information concerning the history of American
involvement in Vietnam had potentially significant value to the public’s assessment of a major
political controversy.
Id. at 91.
36
Building from Redish’s approach to informational speech, Part III highlights conceptual
challenges that arise for dual-purpose informational speech such as vulnerability speech. It melds
Redish’s four factors with key elements of the O’Brien and Corley/Vartuli tests to generate a
framework perhaps more attuned to the mixed communication media reality of today that includes code
speech. The framework balances stimulating debate on matters of public concern in novel, esoteric
knowledge spaces on the one hand, and limiting the weaponization of that speech to protect national
security interests on the other. For a discussion of the O’Brien test, see infra note 72 and accompanying
text.
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be simultaneously technology neutral but informed by the unique dynamics
of new technologies. As such, the doctrinal tensions around unlawful
advocacy and informational speech must be blended with the doctrinal
tensions around code speech. Vulnerability speech such as Jack’s and other
novel technology-mediated speech contexts 37 force us to confront these
existing doctrinal deficits in tandem.
In particular, two problematic First Amendment questions emerge
from this doctrinal blending. First, current First Amendment doctrine lacks
a coherent framework for analyzing computer code as speech in nondigital
contexts. Second, assuming both code and accompanying expression are
deemed potentially protected speech, no doctrinal clarity exists on the point
of when this blended multimedia expression crosses the line from protected
informational speech into unprotected unlawful advocacy. In particular, it
is not clear how to doctrinally unpack informational speech in a context
like the Internet—a context where code, i.e., the speech itself, can be used
as a weapon by third parties to inflict national security harms. 38
1. Code Speech: Lessons About Technology Neutrality.—As
explained by Professor James Gibson, “[L]egal regulation of computer
code raises First Amendment concerns and brings to the fore related issues
of autonomy, transparency, and accountability—although the degree to
which formal First Amendment protection should apply to code is a matter
of much debate.” 39 Although several cases have litigated the extent of First
Amendment protection for code, these first-generation code speech cases
have left open several vexing doctrinal holes, for example, whether code on
a website should be analyzed differently from identical code written on a
T-shirt. 40
A majority of scholars and experts have argued that code is usually
speech for First Amendment purposes. 41 However, some legal scholarship
37

See supra note 12.
For example, foreign governments might use zero-day exploits of the caliber of Flame, an
unusually sophisticated piece of malware, to inflict significant damage on the United States’ interests.
For a discussion of the sophistication of Flame and similar viruses, see, for example, Flame: Trying to
Unravel the Mystery of ‘Sophisticated’ Spying Malware, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 30, 2012), http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science/jan-june12/theflame_05-30.html; David Goldman, Super-Virus
Flame Raises the Cyberwar Stakes, CNN MONEY (May 30, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2012/05/30/technology/flame-virus/index.htm; Raphael Satter, Security Firm: New Computer Virus
Prowling Mideast, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/
2012-08-09/kaspersky-weve-found-new-virus-linked-to-stuxnet.
39
James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 189–90 (2005).
40
See infra text accompanying notes 53–56.
41
See, e.g., Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629 (2000)
(arguing that code is usually properly classified as speech for First Amendment purposes); see also
Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 720
(2000) (disagreeing with portions of Tien’s analytical framework, but agreeing that computer code “that
is itself part of the public dialogue” is speech covered by the First Amendment). Other contributions to
the debate over the constitutional status of code include Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L.
38
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has asserted that courts “should have adopted a more nuanced intent-based
test that would consider the speaker’s purpose in publishing code.” 42 But
scholars disagree about the appropriate contours of this protection, and
some authors have questioned, in particular, the appropriateness of
extending First Amendment protection to potentially malicious code:
viruses 43 and exploit code.
a. Code and intellectual property harms.—A tension between
intellectual property law and the First Amendment is clearly visible in the
first generation of code speech cases—particularly on the point of code
presented in nondigital media. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 44
the Second Circuit considered the constitutionality of the antitrafficking
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 45 under the First
Amendment. The defendants, Corley and his company, 2600 Enterprises,
Inc., a hacker enthusiast publication, challenged the DMCA in connection
with an injunction barring Corley from publishing DeCSS, a program
released by a Norwegian teenager and two unidentified individuals, which
circumvented copy protection on DVDs. 46
REV. 99 (2000); Ryan Christopher Fox, Comment, Old Law and New Technology: The Problem of
Computer Code and the First Amendment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 871 (2002); and R. Polk Wagner, Note,
The Medium Is the Mistake: The Law of Software for the First Amendment, 51 STAN. L. REV. 387, 398
(1999) (arguing for a more context-based approach to First Amendment protection of code, which “asks
whether the regulation [of computer code] is intended to suppress free expression”).
42
Recent Case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2042, 2045 (2002); see also Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code?: Thoughts on FirstGeneration Internet Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1290–93 (2000) (arguing that computer code
should be analyzed based on what it says, not what it is, and that treating all code as speech covered by
the First Amendment merely because it consists of language is overinclusive).
43
See, e.g., David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses of
Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1519 (2003); Robert Plotkin, Fighting
Keywords: Translating the First Amendment to Protect Software Speech, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 329, 348‒51.
44
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). For a discussion of Corley, see, for example, Joseph P. Bauer,
Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 831, 861 n.153 (2010), and Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 67‒70
(2007); see also Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV.
41, 45‒46 (2007), discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which the defendants challenged
on constitutional grounds in Corley.
45
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). The DMCA targets not
only the circumvention of digital walls such as encryption, “but also anyone who would traffic in a
technology primarily designed to circumvent a digital wall.” Corley, 273 F.3d at 435.
46
Corley wanted to make DeCSS available for download on his website, which was a corollary to
his print publication. Corley, 273 F.3d. at 434‒35. In November 1999, Corley posted an article about
the movie industry, DVDs, and DeCSS to his website. Id. at 439. The article detailed how CSS, the
encryption technology used in DVDs, was cracked and the legal battles around DeCSS, the program
that cracked it. Id. At the end of the article, Corley posted and linked to a copy of the object and source
code of DeCSS. At trial, he argued that writing a story about DeCSS without including the code would
have been “analogous to printing a story about a picture and not printing the picture.” Id. The lower
court “entered a permanent injunction barring Corley from posting DeCSS on his web site or from
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The Second Circuit explained that “[c]ommunication does not lose
constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is expressed in the
language of computer code.”47 Nevertheless, the court asserted that
intermediate and not strict scrutiny was appropriate for code speech
because computer code can achieve results with only a “momentary
intercession of human action,” which could be “as limited and
instantaneous as a single click of a mouse.” 48 Consequently, the court
reasoned that computer code should receive a lower level of First
Amendment protection than ordinary speech because of this “functionality”
argument—the ability of code to “instantly cause a computer to accomplish
tasks . . . [means that] functionality is really a proxy for effects or harm.” 49
Ultimately upholding the injunctions, the Second Circuit reached for an
analogy from physical space, implicitly comparing the posting and linking
of DeCSS to a bookstore that chooses to sell and distribute obscene
materials. 50 As Professor Dan Burk has eloquently described, courts’
struggles to find parallels in physical space for code has manifested itself in
the confusion over regulating computer code in different formats, resulting

knowingly linking via a hyperlink to any other web site containing DeCSS” and rejected arguments that
the injunction violated the First Amendment protections. Id. at 436.
47
Id. at 445.
48
Id. at 451.
49
Id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50
See id. at 457. Ultimately, the Second Circuit upheld the antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA,
framing the questions around the protectability of code as issues best reserved for Congress because
they implicate public policy choices. Id. at 452.
A second case to undertake this analysis similarly upheld an injunction against a poster of DeCSS.
In DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Bunner, the California Supreme Court analyzed the appropriateness
of injunctive relief in connection with DeCSS software under California’s version of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. 75 P.3d 1, 9 (Cal. 2003). The lower court had concluded that the plaintiff was likely to
prevail on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. Id. at 9‒10. The lower
court concluded that the CSS technology contained protectable trade secrets, derived independent
economic value from its secrecy, and reasonable efforts had been made to sustain its secrecy. Further,
the court determined that the author of DeCSS had obtained these trade secrets through reverse
engineering processes in violation of a license agreement, constituting acquisition through improper
means. Id.
The California Supreme Court, despite acknowledging that code is entitled to First Amendment
protection, also upheld both the preliminary injunction against Bunner’s First Amendment challenges
and the permanent injunction, provided that the injunction was warranted under California’s trade secret
law. Id. at 19‒20. The court found no basis in the First Amendment to prevent such injunctions. Id.
Bunner claimed he had posted DeCSS on his website because “it would enable Linux users to use and
enjoy DVDs available for purchase or rental in video stores and make Linux more attractive and viable
to consumers.” Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the court in Bunner noted, trade secret
law also seeks to promote and maintain commercial standards, a significant governmental interest. Id. at
12. The court asserted that “‘[t]he mere fact that’ Bunner ‘claims an expressive . . . purpose does not
give [him] a First Amendment right to ‘appropriat[e] to [himself] the harvest of those who have sown.’”
Id. at 14 (alterations in original) (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 541 (1987)).
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in different treatment for symbols printed in hardcopy and symbols in
machine-readable media. 51 Professor Radin has also commented on “the
anomalous dual treatment of computer programs in intellectual property
law. Computer programs are both text and machine. They are text when
considered as code statements, they are machines when considered as
devices for accomplishing a task.” 52
This confusion from intellectual property law regarding whether code
is text or machine has also filtered into—or at least is implicit in—First
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, during the time that DeCSS was
being shared in the wild on the Internet, Copyleft, a small New Jerseybased company, created T-shirts that were emblazoned with the source
code for DeCSS. 53 The advertisements for the shirts stated that the shirts
functioned as a way to “[s]how [their] disapproval of the DVD CCA” 54 and
as a way to make a protest statement against the DMCA. However, shortly
after the shirts were referenced at trial during the Corley case, Copyleft was
added as a defendant in the litigation.55 Unsurprisingly, the DVD CCA
claimed that the shirts constituted “every bit as much of a theft of the trade
secrets as was the posting on websites which was enjoined by the courts.”56
Although a preliminary injunction was issued, it was lifted on appeal. Thus,
the First Amendment issues that these T-shirts raised about mixed media—
in this case, the cotton reproduction of cryptography code—were never
resolved, despite being echoed in the later code “trafficking” cases. And, as
Part I.B.2 will explain, these questions are now resurfacing in the context
of vulnerability speech.
b. Code “trafficking”.—A second strand of code speech cases—
what might be termed the “code trafficking” cases—left open the question
of when software crosses the line from an expressive communication into a
regulable commodity. This second strand of code speech cases highlights
51

See, e.g., Burk, supra note 41, at 105. Professor Burk has insightfully argued that an “imminent
collapse” looms for “the carefully drawn constitutional balance between the Intellectual Property
Clause and the Free Speech Clause.” Id. at 102.
52
Margaret Jane Radin, Lecture, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1143 (2002).
53
Four dollars from the sale of each T-shirt was donated to the Electronic Frontier Foundation in
order to defray the cost of defending the individuals and organizations who were named in the DeCSS
lawsuits instituted by the DVD industry. See Sara Crasson, Note, Are DeCSS T-Shirts Dirty Laundry?:
Wearable, Non-Executable Computer Code as Protected Speech, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 169, 193 (2004). However, not all content is protected by default under the First Amendment,
particularly when copyright or trademark infringement is involved. Professor Burk correctly cautions
that despite substantial overlap, “the scope of expression in copyright and the scope of expression in
free speech are not coextensive. . . . [T]he First Amendment clearly protects some types of expression
that the copyright statute does not cover.” Burk, supra note 41, at 126.
54
Crasson, supra note 53 (alteration in original).
55
Id. at 194; see Farhad Manjoo, Court to Address DeCSS T-Shirt, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2000), http://
www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2000/08/37941.
56
Manjoo, supra note 55.
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the challenge of distinguishing between regulating speech and regulating
potentially hazardous materials, a tension that was presciently identified by
Professor Dan Farber:
In tomorrow’s world, however, the two categories [of digital speech and
digital products] will probably be more difficult to distinguish, a change that is
already underway. Expressive commodities—economically valuable
information transmissions—often can be seen as either commodities or
expression. Speech regulations may no longer seem so sharply unlike
commercial regulations, as the boundary between commerce and speech
erodes. 57

As Professor Dan Burk reminds us, while the First Amendment may
protect a report describing a scientist’s research, it is doubtful that the First
Amendment prohibits the regulation of the underlying research materials.
The government can restrict the movement and dissemination of such
materials if, for example, they contain “organisms that may prove
pathogenic or ecologically destructive.” 58
It was precisely this type of tension that led the Second Circuit to
differentiate its own decision in Corley from its decision in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Vartuli. 59 In Vartuli, a software program
called Recurrence was sold by its creators for the purpose of telling users
when to buy or sell futures contracts through analyzing currency futures
market transactions. 60 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
charged the defendants with violating federal law for, among other things,
failing to register as commodity trading advisors in connection with their
distribution of the software. 61 The defendants argued that the software was
protected speech and that the registration requirement was an
impermissible prior restraint. 62 The Second Circuit rejected the defendants’
constitutional claim and stated that “in the form it was sold and marketed
by the defendants,” it did not generate speech protected by the First

57
Daniel A. Farber, Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods, Network Effects, and
Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 789–90 (2000) (footnote omitted).
58
Burk, supra note 41, at 111. The cryptography-algorithm code trafficking cases highlight this
tension. For example, the source code for Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), an e-mail encryption software
package, is currently available for purchase as a hardcover book on Amazon. See PGP: Source
Code and Internals [Hardcover], AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/PGP-Internals-Philip-RZimmermann/dp/0262240394/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1292276076&sr=8-1 (last visited
Mar. 21, 2013). Yet PGP’s creator, Phil Zimmermann, was investigated for several years because of the
code’s publication online, which was alleged to violate U.S. export restrictions regarding cryptographic
software. See Philip Zimmermann: Creator of PGP and Zfone, PHILZIMMERMANN.COM, https://www.
philzimmermann.com/EN/background/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
59
228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000).
60
See id. at 98‒99.
61
See id. at 100.
62
See id. at 109.
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Amendment. 63 In particular, the Second Circuit highlighted that instead of
trying to generate debate over matters of public interest connected to
commodities trading, the software encouraged users to adhere to its
recommendations blindly, without second-guessing or analyzing. 64 In other
words, the court asked whether the distribution of the software knowingly
furthered an illegal enterprise or sought to stimulate debate—the same
question at issue in an analysis of informational speech under the First
Amendment.
Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit, in Bernstein v. United States
Department of Justice, 65 addressed a challenge to restrictions on the export
of cryptography from the United States. Bernstein, a student at the
University of California, Berkeley, sought to publish a paper and associated
source code on an encryption system he had authored. 66 The Ninth Circuit
ruled that Bernstein’s source code constituted speech protected by the First
Amendment and that the restrictions on its publication were
unconstitutional. 67 However, in concluding comments, the Ninth Circuit
was clear in highlighting that the holding was a narrow one 68 and that the
court did not hold that all software is expressive speech 69 for purposes of
the First Amendment. In the words of the court, “We do not hold that all
software is expressive. Much of it surely is not.” 70
Meanwhile, in Karn v. United States Department of State, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia decided a case involving export
63

Id. at 111.
See id.
65
176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999).
66
See id. at 1135‒36.
67
See id. at 1145.
68
See id.
69
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s hesitation in deeming all code expressive, an argument exists that
code functions at least as a diary would for its authors. For example, a leading information security
researcher recently tweeted, “It is a curious sensation, revisiting code you wrote long ago. Not unlike
having mental conversations with your younger self.” Dan Kaminsky, @dakami, TWITTER (July 15,
2012, 6:26 PM), https://twitter.com/dakami/status/224676355877502976.
70
Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1145. Similarly, in Junger v. Daley, the Sixth Circuit considered the
request of a law professor to post encryption source code on his website in connection with
demonstrating the functionality of the code to his students. 209 F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2000). He
submitted three applications to the Commerce Department asking for a determination with respect to
whether export restrictions covered the code. Id. The Export Administration found that the first chapter
of Professor Junger’s textbook was an allowable unlicensed export, but asserted that the export of the
book in electronic form would require a license if the text contained the software. See id. at 484. Junger
then filed a facial challenge to the export regulations on First Amendment grounds. Id. While
remanding the case to the district court for consideration of Junger’s constitutional challenge to the
regulations, the Sixth Circuit deemed source code to be protected under the First Amendment, stating
that “[b]ecause computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas
about computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 485.
However, the court went on to say that “[w]e recognize that national security interests can outweigh the
interests of protected speech and require the regulation of speech.” Id.
64
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control limitations on diskettes containing source code for cryptographic
algorithms. 71 Unlike the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, this district court upheld
the regulation of the diskettes under the O’Brien test, 72 reasoning it is
within the power of the government to control the export of defense
articles, and it furthers the significant government interest in the regulation
of cryptographic products in a narrowly tailored way. 73
Hence, cases such as Vartuli, Bernstein, and Karn also offer no clear
guidance in determining when code is protected as speech and when code
is regulable as a product. As technology has progressed, this blurring of the
digital speech‒digital product line has become even more complicated. In
particular, today’s code speech embodies the potential of both simultaneous
and “time-shifted” harm to arise from informational speech such as
Barnaby Jack’s—a novel feature of today’s second-generation
informational speech, which blends both code and noncode elements as
part of the communication.
2.

71

Second-Generation Informational Speech: Simultaneous and
“Time-Shifted” Harms.—In an exceptionally forward-looking

925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996). As Lee Tien explains:
The oral argument in Karn . . . presents an example of how critics confuse the medium and the
message. During the oral argument, the D.C. Circuit presented a hypothetical about AWACS
planes—ordinary planes converted to perform special functions. The court hypothesized that one
could place this special function into a CD-ROM containing a computer program, then display
this software as text or numbers on a screen, and finally transcribe it into a book that the First
Amendment would cover. The court then asked, “Does it follow that the CD-ROM that got
slipped into the hardware of the airplane is speech?”
This question confuses the information recorded on the CD-ROM with the package consisting
of the disk and the recorded information. The correct approach must distinguish between the
software as text, the form of the text, the physical medium, and running the software. . . .
Tien, supra note 41, at 687 (footnotes omitted).
72
See infra notes 95‒97 and accompanying text. The O’Brien test refers to the test set forth by the
Supreme Court for expressive conduct in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O’Brien,
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a regulation prohibiting the burning of draft cards
constituted a prior restraint on speech that violated the First Amendment. Id. at 370‒72. The Court
determined that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” Id. at 376. Consequently:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id. at 377. For a discussion of O’Brien, see, for example, Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the
Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1284 (2005) (“The distinction [between speech and
conduct] . . . should be the one suggested by United States v. O’Brien and the other cases that
distinguish content-neutral from content-based speech restrictions: Expression can generally be
regulated to prevent harms that flow from its noncommunicative elements (noise, traffic obstruction,
and the like), but not harms that flow from what the expression expresses.”).
73
See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11.
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article, Professor Margaret Radin argued that the distinction between
technological standards and legal standards is becoming progressively
blurred. 74 And as Professor Radin predicted, convergence between
technological and legal standards increasingly seems inevitable.75 This
inevitability is visible in the First Amendment challenges presented by
second-generation informational speech. Code is increasingly simply one
piece of a broader social conversation occurring across various social
spaces, including various spaces mediated by technology. 76 It is precisely
this dynamic—the unresolved tensions of code printed on T-shirts versus
websites from Corley and the unresolved “dangerous” code issues raised by
Vartuli and Berstein in the context of national security and criminal
activity77—that second-generation informational speech forces us to
include in a First Amendment informational speech analysis. In other
words, today’s informational speech presents a doubly complicated First
Amendment inquiry because it frequently involves analyzing a single
communication that occurs across multiple interwoven communication
media simultaneously. However, perhaps counterintuitively, this mixedmedia operationalization of second-generation informational speech means
74
See Radin, supra note 52. Indeed, an insightful Harvard Law Review note provided the example
of the instability of diminished protection for all code speech because of the inevitable human‒machine
convergence the future will hold. See Recent Case, supra note 42, at 2045 n.33 (providing examples of
other forms of speech that, like some code, are both “speech” in the traditional sense and machine
executable, such as “a Braille version of Hamlet [that] can be run through a machine that will read the
book out loud”). Diminishing the protection for a particular person’s speech simply because the speech
was mediated by a code device—such as dictating a memoir or a law review article draft using Siri—
should not diminish the protectability of the speech from a First Amendment standpoint.
75
We have entered the reality where coded ideas in technological spaces can have immediate,
dramatically socially disruptive consequences in physical spaces—a stolen election, a destroyed power
grid, a hacked stock market, a dead patient. Vulnerability speech forces us to confront the questions of
how to prop up the marketplace of ideas in a technological reality that moves at a blazing speed and, as
the examples listed above show, carries the potential for enormous consequences.
76
As Professor Jennifer Granick explains:
[T]here are strong reasons to reject the argument that code is different, and that restrictions are
therefore good policy. Code’s functionality may help security as much as it hurts it and the open
distribution of functional code has valuable effects for consumers, including the ability to pressure
vendors for more secure products and to counteract monopolistic practices.
Jennifer Stisa Granick, The Price of Restricting Vulnerability Publications, INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y,
Spring 2005, at 1, 1.
77
Although it may be conceptually troubling for First Amendment purposes, the United States has
historically placed limitations on scientifically important speech that has presumptive value under the
First Amendment but that may pose a threat to national security. For example, “the 1917 Voluntary
Tender Act, which gave the Commissioner of Patents the authority to withhold certification from
inventions that might harm U.S. national security, and to turn the invention over to the United States
government for its own use.” Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 274 (2005). Likewise, the “Invention Secrecy Act established a prior
restraint on government employees and . . . private inventors, to prevent them from publishing
inventions deemed to be ‘detrimental to the national security.’” Id. at 275 (quoting Invention Secrecy
Act of 1951, ch. 4, § 1, 66 Stat. 3). The Atomic Energy Act also imposed a prior restraint on the
dissemination of nuclear energy information. See id. at 279.
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that courts should avoid a technology-exceptionalist analysis: the code
speech component of informational speech is not special in its
communication of content. 78 Although on its surface, the presence of
numbers in lieu of Roman characters as a component of speech may seem
foreign and somehow foreboding, at the most basic level, code offers
merely another embodiment of ideas. It is the execution—the time, place,
and manner—of the speech where variation matters, along with the extent
of negative incidental consequences of the selected method of execution of
the communication.
Let us return yet again to the story of Barnaby Jack and his
compromised ATM at DEF CON, which offers a paradigmatic example of
second-generation informational speech. Precisely, Barnaby Jack’s variant
of second-generation informational speech might be termed “vulnerability
speech”—expression that identifies a dangerous flaw in the structure of a
system or product in order to improve security. Vulnerability speech
generally involves both code and noncode components, such as writings
and presentations. In other words, vulnerability speech involves a
description of how and why code is malfunctioning and a demonstration of
how to “break” it. Usually this description is also accompanied by new
code that exploits the dangerous flaw described in order to prove its
existence. To wit, it may involve speech across multiple media that is
inextricably interwoven with code. A second characteristic of vulnerability
speech, like other second-generation informational speech, is that it
involves a situation where informational speech could result in both
simultaneous and time-shifted harms. Just as the DeCSS code in Corley79
was available online at any time, so Barnaby Jack’s ATM compromise is
still available on YouTube today. 80 Further, because a talk such as Jack’s
will be widely distributed and discussed across media and because any
accompanying code essentially recreates a portion of his speech whenever
it is run, the speaker potentially “speaks” on a continuous basis—he speaks
in perpetuity, as long as the talk is available for viewing and the code

78

In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court refused to apply a different level of First Amendment
scrutiny simply because speech happened through code instead of traditional media. 521 U.S. 844, 870
(1997). As one court explained the holding in Reno, “[S]peech on the internet is subject to no greater or
lesser constitutional protection than speech in more traditional media.” United States v. Carmichael,
326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1288‒89 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
79
However, perhaps more so than the defendants in Corley, Jack’s informational speech perhaps
involved a “whistleblower” component, calling attention to the risk of potential criminality that may be
ongoing. See McMillan, supra note 2 (quoting Jack describing his motivation as “to spark discussion on
the best ways to remediate [the ATM’s security problems]”). This description, like Corley, however,
also involved an explanatory component of how one might engage in that criminality in the future.
80
See, e.g., Security Week, supra note 16.
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available for use. In theory, his speech could be repurposed for criminality
at any point. 81
Perhaps this “time-shifted” nature of second-generation informational
speech may remind us of first-generation speech in some respects. For
example, a reader may read instructions on becoming a hit man, the same
way that he might watch a YouTube video about how to exploit a
vulnerable ATM. However, one can argue that the possible inclusion of
executable 82 code and the potentially perpetual real-time nature of secondgeneration informational speech may make it more akin to attending a
rally, such as that in Hess v. Indiana, 83 or watching a recording of that rally.
Thus, disagreeing with Professor Redish and Professor Volokh, I would
argue that the immediacy of the risk of criminality arising out of the
second-generation informational speech is, in fact, more in line with
traditional incitement concerns than one might assume. However, the
“immediacy” analysis from incitement doctrine—“imminent lawless
action”—was certainly not crafted for the Internet age. Further, unlike
Hess, 84 it can be argued that offering code as part of speech is more akin to
handing out protest signs on wooden sticks to assist in “taking back the
street”—signs that might be repurposed as bludgeoning weapons. 85 Yet, in
many cases, the goals of speakers who engage in informational speech are
not at all criminal: instead, frequently the goal of the informational speech
is to directly contribute relevant knowledge to a social conversation on
matters of national importance.
II. CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL VALUE OF INFORMATIONAL SPEECH: A
CASE STUDY OF VULNERABILITY SPEECH
If it is indeed the case that second-generation informational speech
embodies dangers that are more in line with traditional unlawful advocacy
concerns than does first-generation informational speech, playing devil’s
advocate, one might argue that perhaps the doctrinal knots of informational
speech cannot be unraveled. Is it possible that Barnaby Jack is simply a
81

In reality, at the time he gave his presentations at Black Hat and DEF CON, he and the ATM
vendor had patched the vulnerabilities and the risk of criminality was significantly mitigated. See, e.g.,
Schwarz, supra note 9; see also Naraine, supra note 10 (describing the patches introduced by ATM
makers to fix the flaws Jack identified).
82
Executable code refers to code in a form that can be run by a computer, as opposed to source
code, which is meant to be interpreted by a human programmer and which requires an extra step before
it can be run by the machine. See Definition of: Executable Code, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.
com/encyclopedia_term/0,1237,t=executable+code&i=42842,00.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
83
414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
84
See id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85
Despite the presence of code that can be used for an improper purpose in vulnerability speech,
when examining the factors identified by the lower court in Hess as the hallmarks of incitement, the
exhortations in Hess can be viewed as a better fit than vulnerability speech, and yet the Supreme Court
ultimately protected the expression.
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wolf in sheep’s clothing—a particularly cunning criminal posing as a
researcher and merely claiming good intentions? Perhaps the most logical
solution is simply to deem all instructional speech unprotected advocacy of
criminality? Although this approach would certainly be expedient, it would
nevertheless result in a highly undesirable outcome in many cases. As
Professor Redish insightfully asserted, 86 the potential social value of
informational speech warrants consideration, despite the messiness of this
undertaking: “[T]o allow government to characterize as unprotected
unlawful advocacy speech that is on its face nothing more than
informational could give rise to a pervasive chilling effect on the
distribution of information that is potentially valuable on a number of
levels.” 87
The next section unpacks this question of the social value of
informational speech. Specifically, it tries to operationalize the social value
factor Professor Redish included in his framework, highlighting its
complicating role. In this section, using the case study of vulnerability
speech, I argue that social value of informational speech can be assessed as
a combination of two factors: first, the totality of possible positive
incidental effects arising from the speech, and, second, the scarcity of the
contributed information.
A. Of Hit Men and Hackers: Shooting Victims Versus
Shooting Messengers
While the image of Barnaby Jack’s ATM shooting money into the
hands of possible “hacker” malefactors is certainly a dramatic one, the
more interesting part of the story for purposes of a legal analysis occurred
long before Jack’s high-profile demonstrations.88 Jack and his employer at
the time had delayed the presentation for a year in order to allow the ATM
vendor to correct the flaws in its product. 89 By cooperating with the vendor,
86

See Redish, supra note 7, at 90.
Id.
88
See Carl Franzen, Barnaby Jack Ingeniously Hacks ATMs at Black Hat, AOLNEWS (July 29,
2010, 11:35 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/07/29/barnaby-jack-ingeniously-hacks-atms-at-blackhat-video/.
89
In the words of one engineer at the ATM manufacturer:
Barnaby and his colleagues had planned to present his work . . . relatively soon after we had
learned of his attack, so we insisted that they delay their presentation until we had sufficient time
to roll-out our patch to more ATMs. Barnaby’s employer ultimately acquiesced, albeit grudgingly,
and his Black Hat 2009 presentation was cancelled. Apparently this cancellation was something
of a minor scandal among some Black Hat participants, who condemned his employer as
cowardly caving to The Man. Of course I am biased, but I truly view his employer’s decision as
an example of conducting security research responsibly. . . .
....
. . . The enormous benefit is that our ATM is now significantly more secure, because we didn’t
just plug the hole that Barnaby discovered, but we took our defense a thousand times further. . . .
Schwarz, supra note 9.
87
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they not only assisted the company in correcting the product’s information
security imperfections,90 but they also limited the likelihood that criminality
would arise from Jack’s informational speech. Because both sides
cooperated, acknowledged the imperfections in the product, and worked to
remedy them, on the day that hacker crowds bathed in fake dollar bills
raining from the stage, the flaws discovered by Jack were already corrected
and the risk of criminality had been minimized. 91 Consumers were a little
safer as a result.
But let us imagine that a different ATM company produces machines
that—without Jack’s knowledge—suffer from flaws similar to those in the
machines Jack compromised. Let us imagine that a criminal uses Jack’s
exploits and, in lieu of blaming itself for its information security
inadequacies, the company demands that Jack be prosecuted for aiding and
abetting the criminals. Or let us imagine that Jack failed to contact the
ATM company to help patch the flaws. Instead, perhaps he chose to “drop
0-day,” 92 and he released information about the security flaws and exploit
code “into the wild” on a blog whose readership likely includes information
criminals. After criminality ensues (or a prosecutor deems a criminal act to
have occurred), he is criminally prosecuted for aiding and abetting
computer intrusion. Or let us imagine that the vulnerability was not part of
an ATM but instead part of a weapons system. What happens if Jack sells
or “gifts” a zero-day exploit to a private middleman or intermediary, 93 who
then passes it on to a foreign government, which uses Jack’s exploit to
harm U.S. corporate or government interests? Should Jack be prosecuted
for economic espionage or treason? Current First Amendment paradigms
are ill-suited to analyzing Jack’s speech in any of these scenarios. Yet, both
the possible benefits and the possible risks implicated by vulnerability
speech are significant.
1.

Assessing Incidental Effects: Borrowing from United States v.
O’Brien.—Professor Eugene Volokh observed that “many types of
crime-facilitating speech have harmful uses; but they also have valuable
uses, including some that may not at first be obvious. . . . This dual-use
nature has implications for how crime-facilitating speech should be

90

See id.
As I explained in previous work on security, content owners sometimes rely on invasive digital
rights management technologies that behave in the same harmful manner as malicious code used by
information criminals, using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and (weak constructions of)
contractual consent as the legal basis for pushing this code onto users’ machines. See Andrea M.
Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529 (2007). In the context of vulnerability
speech, we find a different variation of this scenario: information security researchers use the tools of
malicious hackers, but usually for the purpose of preventing harm.
92
“Dropping 0-day” is slang for a release of a zero-day exploit.
93
See infra notes 215‒28 and accompanying text.
91
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treated.” 94 It is precisely this dual purpose of some—but not all—
informational speech that complicates the First Amendment inquiry.
Distinguishing between cases where only disproportionately negative
incidental effects exist—i.e., single-purpose informational speech—from
cases where both strong positive and negative incidental effects can exist—
i.e., dual-purpose informational speech—facilitates a more nuanced First
Amendment analysis of informational speech.
As the code speech cases evidence, courts have sometimes turned to
an intermediate standard of scrutiny arising out of United States v. O’Brien
as the basis of an analytical framework in cases involving code. 95 Similarly,
in the context of asserting a common law duty to patch vulnerable code, I
have relied on an analysis springing from O’Brien. 96 Here again in the
context of informational speech, I argue that the language or at least the
spirit of O’Brien offers key guidance. O’Brien highlights a critical factor
that allows us to ferret out the distinction that Volokh postulated: O’Brien
instructs courts to assess the incidental effects of the speech and whether
they undermine key social systems. 97 By focusing on this incidental effects
question from O’Brien, we can postulate this critical distinction between
two types of informational speech—single-purpose informational speech
and dual-purpose informational speech. In other words, O’Brien can
potentially be read to suggest that the classification of informational speech
as single purpose or dual purpose should matter in the analysis of its First
Amendment protection. Single-purpose and dual-purpose informational
speech result in dramatically different incidental effects.
Returning to Rice v. Paladin, 98 the import of this single- versus dualpurpose distinction becomes clear. In Rice, the informational speech at
issue was decidedly single-purpose informational speech, and strongly
negative incidental effects resulted: dead people. Few possible positive
incidental effects can arise from a compilation of information about how to
successfully commit various forms of murder. However, some
informational speech—for example, a website explaining how to grow
marijuana—may have both a strong positive and a negative incidental
effect. For instance, in states where medical marijuana growing is
permitted, this informational speech can result in positive incidental
effects—it furthers the growth of a legal commodity that alleviates physical
94

Volokh, supra note 17, at 1105.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
96
See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable Expectation of
Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109, 145 (2010).
97
See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370–71, 386; see also discussion supra note 72. As I explained
previously, “Just as the Court in O’Brien found a vital interest in the continued functionality of the
Selective Service System, [the negative effects of information security compromise] harm . . . society as
a whole through undermining key social systems. . . .” Matwyshyn, supra note 96, at 147 (footnote
omitted).
98
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
95
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discomfort for some patients. Yet, if the same informational speech is used
by growers seeking to sell marijuana in a jurisdiction where the product is
illegal, negative incidental effects result—the illegal drug trade increases.
Even conceding the possibility of illegal repurposing, this potential misuse
does not negate the compelling possible positive incidental effects and
possible high social value of some types of instructional speech.
2. The Social Stakes: A Tale of Two Vulnerable Systems.—Turning
to our case study to apply this distinction between single- and dual-purpose
informational speech, we must begin by asking whether there are possible
positive incidental effects of vulnerability speech. The answer is yes.
Vulnerability speech clearly falls into the dual-purpose informational
speech category. Although negative incidental effects may indeed arise
from vulnerability speech, vulnerability speech also has the potential for
tremendous positive incidental effects: our future as a viable country may
literally depend on the security improvements vulnerability speech may
trigger.
The social conversation over information security—sometimes called
“cybersecurity” in the context of national security issues involving the
Internet 99—is just beginning in the United States. 100 The last decade has
been marked by the arrival of prevalent state data breach notification
laws, 101 as well as dramatically increased press coverage of information
99
Referring to all of information security, particularly in private sector contexts, as “cybersecurity”
is technically incorrect. “Cyber” has traditionally referred to Internet-only phenomena. Information
security is not solely an Internet phenomenon. Information security questions involve both computer
security and physical security. They must be analyzed as a holistic enterprise relating to the systemic
assessment of information risk throughout the life cycle of a piece of information—from the creation of
a bit of information to its destruction. As such, information security involves concerns over physical
attacks as well as Internet-facilitated attacks. As Barnaby Jack’s compromise of the ATM demonstrates,
many information security problems involve inadequate physical controls—such as being able to
purchase an ATM for home delivery on eBay—and code. Further, as Bradley Manning’s alleged
copying of classified information demonstrates, information security frequently involves elements of
physical security of devices and errors in computer code or settings that can be exploited regardless of
whether the code is accessible through the Internet. See Athima Chansanchai, WikiLeaks Fallout:
Military Bans Thumb Drives, NBCNEWS.COM, http://www.technolog.msnbc.msn.com/technology/
technolog/wikileaks-fallout-military-bans-thumb-drives-125984 (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
100
Information security is also an increasingly lucrative business space. According to some
estimates, the industry is expected to double in the next five years, to be worth over $120 billion by
2017. Tim Wilson, Study: Cybersecurity Market to Double in Next Five Years, DARK READING (July
6, 2012, 12:49 AM), http://www.darkreading.com/security/security-management/240003251/studycybersecurity-market-to-double-in-next-five-years.html. As I have explained in prior scholarship, the
legal issues around information security and software vulnerabilities implicate numerous interwoven
questions of law arising from traditional bodies of law—contract, copyright, tort, securities regulation,
corporate law, and common law duties of care, see Matwyshyn, supra note 96, at 125‒45, and criminal
law and the First Amendment, see id. at 147.
101
For a discussion of data breach notification laws, see, for example, Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel
J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1884‒85 (2011).
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security issues. 102 The continued integrity of core social systems—our
elections, 103 stock markets, 104 national defense, 105 hospitals, 106 drugs, 107
medical devices, 108 air traffic control systems, 109 energy grid, 110 water
supplies, 111 nuclear reactors, 112 and communication grids,113 to name just a
few—all depend on the emergence of a vibrant vulnerability speech
discourse in order to propel improvements in information security. 114 Each
of these core social systems is increasingly dependent upon and controlled
by code—code that is currently inadequately audited in many cases.115
102
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse maintains a list of data breaches specifically to draw public
attention to them. For a list of such data breaches, see, for example, Chronology of Data Breaches:
Security Breaches 2005–Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/
data-breach (last updated Mar. 22, 2013).
103
See infra text accompanying notes 120‒28.
104
See, e.g., Kim Zetter, NSA to Investigate Nasdaq Hack, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (Mar. 30,
2011, 2:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/03/nsa-investigates-nasdaq-hack/.
105
See infra text accompanying note 181.
106
See, e.g., Dan Kaplan, Indiana University Hospital Hacked to Steal Data, SC MAG. DATA
BREACH BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.scmagazine.com/indiana-university-hospital-hacked-to-stealdata/article/225887/.
107
See Peter Murray, No More Skipping Your Medicine—FDA Approves First Digital Pill, FORBES
(Aug. 9, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/08/09/no-more-skipping-yourmedicine-fda-approves-first-digital-pill/.
108
See Kim Carollo, Can Your Insulin Pump Be Hacked?, ABC NEWS MEDICAL UNIT (Apr. 10,
2012, 6:51 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2012/04/10/can-your-insulin-pump-be-hacked/;
Charlie Sorrel, Scientists Demonstrate Deadly WiFi Pacemaker Hack, WIRED GADGET LAB (Mar.
12, 2008, 6:32 AM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2008/03/scientists-demo/.
109
See Heather Kelly, Researcher: New Air Traffic Control System Is Hackable, CNN TECH (July
26, 2012, 6:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/tech/web/air-traffic-control-security.
110
See infra text accompanying notes 203‒07. For example, nuclear power plants and oil
companies might be attractive and potentially vulnerable targets for hackers. See Fernando Alfonso III,
Anonymous Hits Oil Companies, Leaks 1,000 Employee Logins, DAILY DOT (July 16, 2012), http://
www.dailydot.com/news/anonymous-big-oil-exxon-hack/ (oil companies); Andy Greenberg, America’s
Hackable Backbone, FORBES.COM (Aug. 22, 2007, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/22/
scada-hackers-infrastructure-tech-security-cx_ag_0822hack.html (nuclear power plants).
111
See South Houston’s Water Supply Network Hacked, INFOSEC ISLAND (Nov. 18, 2011), http://
www.infosecisland.com/blogview/18244-South-Houstons-Water-Supply-Network-Hacked.html.
112
See Colin Murdock, 8 Things You Won’t Believe Can Be Hacked, CRACKED.COM (Sept. 7,
2011), http://www.cracked.com/article_19412_8-things-you-wont-believe-can-be-hacked.html.
113
See US-CERT, NAT’L CYBER SECURITY DIV., CONTROL SYS. SEC. PROGRAM, POTENTIAL
VULNERABILITIES IN MUNICIPAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS (2006), available at http://www.uscert.gov/control_systems/pdf/Potential_Vulnerabilities_Municipal_Communications_Networks_v1.pdf.
114
Yet, the very same speech that pushes this social policy conversation on information integrity
forward has the potential to cause meaningful economic, democratic, and even sometimes physical
harm to citizens.
115
As the two examples that follow will illustrate, the flawed code that runs critical social systems
is frequently written by companies from the private sector, a private sector that frequently appears to
lack adequate legal and financial incentives to be vigilant about possible information security harms.
For further discussion of duties to correct information security deficiencies, see, for example,
Matwyshyn, supra note 96.
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Software vulnerabilities continue to be a major obstacle to the creation
of secure virtual and physical spaces. 116 Although engineers strive to build
more secure software, systems remain vulnerable, and thousands of new
vulnerabilities are discovered annually. 117 As I have explained elsewhere, 118
vulnerabilities in software programs expose consumers to informationbased harms such as identity theft and loss of control of their machines.119
However, when vulnerabilities exist in software used in critical social
systems, such as elections or as part of the control mechanism for the
power grid, the impact of vulnerable code can damage the lives of millions
of people simultaneously in physical space.
For example, according to the Verified Voting Foundation,
approximately a quarter to a third of all U.S. voters used paperless
electronic voting machines in the 2012 November elections. 120 Yet, the
security of those systems has been found to be sorely lacking in the past.121
116
Vulnerabilities often arise from “incorrect memory management, poorly designed authentication
mechanisms, and incorrect assumptions about user inputs.” What the Power Industry
Has to Learn About Cyber Vulnerability Disclosure, IEEE SMART GRID (Jan. 2012), http://smartgrid.
ieee.org/newsletter/january-2012/479-what-the-power-industry-has-to-learn-about-cyber-vulnerabilitydisclosure.
117
The government-sponsored National Vulnerability Database logs thousands of new
vulnerabilities every year. See id. Vulnerabilities can generally be classified as issues arising from
either the software design or implementation processes. Design issues generally spring from erroneous
understanding of system security requirements, leading to inadequate authentication mechanisms, weak
encryption ciphers, or limited software configurability. Implementation vulnerabilities are usually due
to software programming mistakes, such as inappropriate memory allocation, errors implementing
encryption mechanisms, or missing user-input validation. Both types of errors generally point to a
broader deficit in an organization: inadequate focus on security in the development process as a whole.
See id.
118
See Matwyshyn, supra note 96.
119
See id. at 113.
120
See Jaeah Lee, Every Vote Counts. Almost, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2012, at 33, 33; see also
PAMELA SMITH ET AL., COUNTING VOTES 2012: A STATE BY STATE LOOK AT VOTING TECHNOLOGY
PREPAREDNESS 10 (2012), available at http://countingvotes.org/sites/default/files/CountingVotes2012_
Final_August2012.pdf (listing states with no requirement of paper authentication of electronically
tabulated votes).
121
For example, Princeton computer scientists reverse engineered the hardware of a Sequoia
electronic voting machine and a corresponding memory cartridge. See ANDREW W. APPEL ET AL.,
INSECURITIES AND INACCURACIES OF THE SEQUOIA AVC ADVANTAGE 9.00H DRE VOTING MACHINE
(2008),
available
at
http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/voting/
advantage/advantage-insecurities-redacted.pdf; see also Andrew W. Appel et al., Insecurities and
Inaccuracies of the Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H DRE Voting Machine, PRINCETON U. CENTER
FOR INFO. TECH. POL’Y, http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/voting/
advantage/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (summarizing report and related litigation); Kelly Jackson
Higgins, E-Voting Machine Hack Steals Votes, DARK READING (Aug. 12, 2009, 4:27 PM), http://
www.darkreading.com/security/news/219200437/e-voting-machine-hack-steals-votes.html (describing
the team’s methodology). They then wrote an exploit that simulated an election. See id. In this way,
they were capable of corrupting the results of the election. Microsoft Research also published a paper
describing vulnerabilities in allegedly “fully-verifiable” direct-recording electronic systems that
nevertheless allowed a hacker to “undetectably alter large numbers of votes.” Josh Benaloh & Eric
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In fact, vulnerabilities in some California voting machines were so severe
that the State of California decertified these machines, banning them from
electoral use, 122 and joined a false claims suit against the company that sold
the machines. 123 However, in lieu of embracing audit by information
security experts to ensure that their products are as secure as possible,
voting technology companies have sometimes decided to resort to the
courts to engage with their critics.124 Yet, the vulnerabilities in these voting
systems potentially remain extensive and underexplored. 125 In the words of
one researcher, “It’s much easier to steal the election, right at the electronic
voting machine . . . . In many cases, we see security devices or electronic
voting machines where we really have to wonder, ‘Did anybody spend 60
seconds figuring out the security issues?’” 126
Similarly, although by 2016 more than 75% of U.S. electric meters
will be converted to smart meters, 127 the security of many of these devices
is in doubt, and the shift to a smart grid carries with it new information
security risks. Vulnerabilities in new smart grid technologies, like those in
election software, have been well documented and, nevertheless, appear to
Lazarus, The Trash Attack: An Attack on Verifiable Voting Systems and a Simple Mitigation 1, http://
research.microsoft.com/pubs/155590/The%20Trash%20Attack.pdf. Similarly, scientists at Argonne
National Laboratory were able to successfully alter votes in some types of electronic voting machines
by inserting a $10 component along with a $15 radio frequency device that manipulated touch screens
by remote control, leaving no traceable evidence that vote tampering had occurred. Phil Rogers, Most
Security Measures Easy to Breach, Experts Say, NBC CHI. (Jan. 7, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://www.
nbcchicago.com/news/tech/argonne-laboratory-technology-security-breach-113054464.html#ixzz1Eku
08Gug. The researchers believe these types of attacks are possible on “a wide variety of machines with
little technical expertise.” Rob Lever, Questions Linger in US on High-Tech Voting, PHYS.ORG (Mar.
11, 2012), http://phys.org/news/2012-03-linger-high-tech-voting.html (internal quotation mark omitted).
122
This decertification was the result of joint efforts by information security researchers and
journalists. See Ryan Paul, California Voting Machine Security Tests Uncover Serious Vulnerabilities,
ARS TECHNICA (July 29, 2007, 11:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2007/07/california-votingmachine-security-tests-uncover-serious-vulnerabilities/.
123
CA Sues Diebold for E-Vote Machine False Claims, RENSE.COM, http://rense.com/general57/
machine.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
124
See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. JONES & BARBARA SIMONS, BROKEN BALLOTS (2012). Meanwhile,
Congress painstakingly continues to debate the efficacy of requiring audit trails in voting machines. A
bill proposed to require paper-ballot audit died but was subsequently reintroduced and is now in
committee. See H.R.5816—Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2011, OPENCONGRESS,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h5816/show (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
125
See Diego Aranha, Univ. of Brasilia, Software Vulnerabilities in the Brazilian Voting Machine,
USENIX, https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote12/title-tbd (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
126
Rogers, supra note 121 (quoting Roger Johnston of Argonne National Laboratory). In the 2012
election, the hacktivist collective Anonymous made allegations of attempted electronic-voting-machine
manipulation in Ohio and their role in preventing the success of these efforts. See Natasha Lennard, Did
Anonymous Stop Rove from Stealing the Election?, SALON (Nov. 20, 2012, 7:54 AM), http://
www.salon.com/2012/11/20/did_anonymous_stop_rove_stealing_the_election/.
127
The smart grid market is surging. According to some estimates, the smart grid market currently
stands at approximately $34 billion per year. Smart Grid Market Projected at $33 Billion, DVIRC (June
6, 2012), http://www.dvirc.org/smart-grid-market-projected-at-33-billion.
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persist. 128 One veteran security expert explained it as follows: “The smart
grid is a lot of different things, but, at it’s core, will be a lot of embedded
devices, each with a network stack to communicate with each other . . . .
[The smart grid] is taking this read-only medium, from a consumer
standpoint, and making it a read-write.” 129 Because of this shift, the
importance of minimizing security vulnerabilities in the smart grid is
stark. 130 Another researcher who studies supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) issues highlights that public debate on smart grid
vulnerability is urgent:
Unless we wake up and realize what we’re doing, there is 100% certainty
of total catastrophic failure of the entire power infrastructure within 3
years . . . . How governments and utilities are blindly merging the power grid
with the internet, and effectively without any protection, is insanity at its
finest.” 131

As this build-out of the smart grid continues, the public debate over its
desirability necessitates an assessment of the smart grid’s information
security—an assessment that can only occur through vulnerability
speech. 132
When information security researchers expose flaws in code, their
vulnerability speech highlights ways that systems can be attacked by
malefactors. But in doing so they trigger critical debate around information
security, and ideally, the vulnerable systems become strengthened as a
result of the speech. Thus, security researchers and their vulnerability
speech perform an essential function in the information ecosystem: they
frequently keep us all safe(r). Just as one of the most important functions of
reputable newspapers is to run checks on the facts they present in their
articles, so too security researchers are the “fact-checkers” of the
information technology ecosystem. They ensure that products and systems
function honestly—as advertised, as expected, and with maximum safety
128

See What the Power Industry Has to Learn About Cyber Vulnerability Disclosure, supra note

116.
129
Robert Lemos, Smart-Grid Firms Need Security Education, SECURITYFOCUS (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/932 (quoting Joshua Pennell, CEO of IOActive).
130
See Press Release, Take Back Your Power, Hacking Expert David Chalk Joins Urgent Call to
Halt Smart Grid (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://takebackyourpower.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/
04/Smart-Grid-Cybersecurity-Press-Release-12Apr2012.pdf. As explained by one expert, “We’re in a
state of crisis . . . . The front door is open and there is no lock to be had. There is not a power meter or
device on the grid that is protected from hacking—if not already infected—with some sort of trojan
horse that can cause the grid to be shut down or completely annihilated.” Id. (quoting David Chalk).
131
Id. (quoting David Chalk).
132
Some local governments recognize this public concern and offer their citizens ways to opt out
of the smart metering program or have instituted moratoriums on its further expansion. California,
Maine, Vermont, Louisiana, Michigan, Connecticut, Quebec, the U.K., and the Netherlands currently
offer opt outs. In the United States, moratoriums have been enforced in several regions, including the
counties of Santa Cruz and Marin. See id.
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for the good of the entire information ecosystem. 133 They are also the front
line in addressing what I have elsewhere termed an information security
“Red Queen Effect”—a constant arms race between criminals and
defenders where innovation is required simply to maintain the status quo in
information security. 134 In other words, vulnerability speech is a clear
example of dual-purpose informational speech with strong possible positive
incidental effects and thus possible high social value for society.
Having elaborated on the positive incidental effects prong of
determining “high social value” informational speech, let us next turn to
the question of information scarcity and its implications for a construction
of a definition of “high social value” informational speech.
B. Information Scarcity: Of Harbingers and Harassment
Not all information is equally available in society. Frequently, the
most useful information for purposes of a reasoned analysis of public
policy is information that is not readily accessible: it is sometimes held by
only a small number of experts. Dynamics around some forms of
informational speech reflect this information scarcity problem. In other
words, sometimes the most socially useful informational speech may also
be highly esoteric and limited in availability.
1. Lessons from Information Valuation.—As trade secret law135 and
database valuation practices136 demonstrate, the potential value of
information is driven by its scarcity, not by its prevalence. 137 Similarly, the
existence of whistleblower laws 138 reflects an attempt to solve an
133

Another metaphor for information security researchers might be one of whistleblowers. Indeed,
many information security researchers would categorize themselves in this manner. For a discussion of
the various overlapping constructions of information disclosure in technology contexts, see, for
example, Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security
Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1526 (2012).
134
See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective: Spam as an International
Security Issue, 3 SCRIPTED 370, 385 (2006), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol34/matwyshyn.asp#3.2.
135
Trade secrets lose their value if publicly shared. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 536, 538 (2005) (defining a “trade secret” as information that “derives
independent economic value . . . from not being generally known”).
136
For a discussion of database and other intangible asset valuation, see, for example, Robert F.
Reilly, Intangible Asset Valuation, Damages, and Transfer Price Analyses in the Health Care Industry,
J. HEALTH CARE FIN., Spring 2010, at 24, 25‒27.
137
It is a basic precept of information economics that scarcity drives information value. See, e.g.,
Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public
Domain PART I, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 71 (1993) (“[I]nformation is scar[c]e and such
scarcity creates or destroys value.”).
138
Under Dodd–Frank, a law with representative whistleblower provisions, whistleblowers who
provide information that leads to a successful SEC enforcement action may receive 10%–30% of the
monetary sanctions if more than $1 million is collected. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2006). For a
discussion of whistleblower laws, see, for example, Robert P. Brooks, Understanding Key New
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information scarcity problem. In instances where informational speech
exposes the speaker to risk of criminal prosecution or civil suit, many
speakers will assess whether the personal risk is warranted and decide
against contributing their knowledge to public debate. However, when the
knowledge held by these speakers represents a scarce commodity, perhaps
the product of years of professional training and expertise, the loss of their
contribution to the public debate is particularly unfortunate and sometimes
simply not replicable from other sources: the information their speech
would have contained might not be available from any other speaker. In
other words, the scarcity of particular informational speech demonstrating
expertise may make it “high social value” speech.
This idea of placing a thumb on the legal scale for expertise is not
new. In perhaps a somewhat parallel manner, courts frequently look to
experts to guide the determination of complicated disputes.139 Here, it can
be argued that because society benefits greatly from experts’ speech, risk
buffers as part of an “expert-friendly” informational speech model should
be crafted to incentivize experts to share their esoteric knowledge pro bono,
particularly when that knowledge implicates policy issues of social
importance.
2.

The
Pernicious
Persistence
of
Security
Through
Obscurity.—Turning to our case study of vulnerability speech, the
knowledge held by elite information security researchers is particularly
scarce. Talent deficits in the information security space abound, and the top
information security practitioners are in constant demand, 140 commanding
six-figure salaries. 141 In fact, the scarcity of expertise in information
security likely provides a partial explanation for why widespread
information vulnerability persists in our society. 142
For example, public companies have long been confused about
securities law reporting obligations and whether severe data breaches and

Employment Regulations, in ROBERT P. BROOKS, COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS
(2012), available at 2012 WL 3279181.
139
For example, courts frequently turn to medical doctors to testify regarding medical issues during
trial and offer professional opinions based on the doctor’s expertise. For a discussion of expert
testimony generally, see, for example, Brian R. Gallini, To Serve and Protect?: Officers as Expert
Witnesses in Federal Drug Prosecutions, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363 (2012).
140
See, e.g., Gordon Smith, Skills Deficit Leaving IT Security Jobs Unfilled, SILICON REPUBLIC
(Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.siliconrepublic.com/strategy/item/18903-skills-deficit-leaving-it-s.
141
See, e.g., Fahmida Y. Rashid, IT Security Salaries Expected to Grow 4.5% in 2012, EWEEK
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/IT-Security-Salaries-Expected-to-Grow-45-in2012-166496/.
142
Cf. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information
Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 181‒82 (2005) (describing the
ineffectiveness of the “security through obscurity” strategy followed by some data intensive firms, in
which the firms do not disclose or otherwise foster dialogue about security risks they face).
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security vulnerabilities constitute material reportable events. 143 Yet, despite
this obvious confusion, the SEC issued no direct guidance on the topic until
2011 144—guidance that the SEC asserts is currently not being followed with
adequate rigor. 145 Similarly, despite ample evidence of pervasive neglect of
information security in both the public and private sector since the early
2000s, the legal community has been painfully slow in understanding the
importance of information security. 146
Indeed, many companies perceive financial incentives to exist in both
failing to invest in adequate information security and then attempting to
hide the existence of security vulnerabilities. 147 As explained by both
Professor Peter Swire 148 and by me elsewhere,149 the approach of seeking to
maintain the secrecy of security flaws as a corporate strategy is widely
discredited as ineffective in the computer security literature. Thus, when
entities choose to follow the ineffective strategy of security through
obscurity, the inevitable consequence of this irresponsible corporate
decision becomes an adversarial relationship between the entity and the
security researchers who discover and speak publicly about existing
problems with the company’s vulnerable products. For example, although
several reasons exist why vulnerabilities in the smart grid persist,150 a recent
See id. at 188‒90.
See CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 13,
2011), http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. And public companies do
indeed face the problem of interpreting their disclosure obligations in the event of a breach. For
example, recently Wyndham Hotels came under scrutiny in connection with a data breach and an
alleged failure to disclose. See Elinor Mills, FTC Sues Wyndham Hotels over Data Breaches, CNET
(June 26, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57460551-83/ftc-sues-wyndham-hotelsover-data-breaches/.
145
Peter J. Toren, Disclosing Cyber Security Incidents: The SEC Weighs In, FORBES (June 4, 2012,
1:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/06/04/disclosing-cyber-security-incidents-thesec-weighs-in/; see also Richard Lardner, U.S. Pressures Companies to Report Cybercrime, USA
TODAY (June 29, 2012, 6:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/story/2012-06-29/reportingcybercrime/55921858/1.
146
Few top law schools have courses in information security law and very few legal academics
research in this space. Further, most government agencies have only recently started to consider the
impact of information security as part of their duties. Meanwhile, some companies—whether by design
or by neglect—sometimes inaccurately describe their privacy and security practices both to the public
and to agencies investigating them. See, e.g., In re Google Inc., 27 FCC Rcd. 4012 (2012).
147
Some companies ignore the impact of information vulnerability on society and business
partners, externalizing costs and failing to take responsibility for the harms they cause. See Jeremy
Kirk, Hacker Group Targets Firms that Hide Security Flaws, PCWORLD (Mar. 29, 2008, 7:30 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/143961/hacker_group_targets_firms_that_hide_security_flaws.html.
148
Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source,
Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2006).
149
See Matwyshyn, supra note 142, at 162‒65.
150
Although advanced metering infrastructures enable more dynamic generation, distribution, and
consumption, smart meters, wireless repeaters, and routers must operate in physically unprotected
environments and communicate with potentially hostile consumer systems. What is more, expanded
bandwidth requirements tempt system designers to rely on nondedicated and often untrusted networks
143
144
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IEEE article asserted that one such reason is that “many power industry
vendors have limited experience dealing with the vulnerability disclosure
process. So software vulnerability problems often produce disagreements
between vendors and researchers as to the severity of vulnerabilities and
appropriate mitigation efforts.” 151 Even when an author of vulnerable code
initially cooperates with a researcher who finds a vulnerability, tensions
sometimes arise because the researcher may believe that the company is
failing to adequately prioritize the release of timely patches. 152 Meanwhile,
some companies believe that researchers fail to understand the business
realities that sometimes dictate a slower patching process. 153
In other words, complications and legal wrangling frequently arise
when software vulnerabilities are first discovered. Because the security
researcher who has discovered the vulnerability is usually unaffiliated with
the vendor, the researcher is faced with the issue of ascertaining the proper
method of disclosing the sensitive vulnerability information, particularly if
the author of the vulnerable product is uncooperative. 154 Researchers are

because of their lower costs. A combination of expanded technology dependencies and greater public
exposure will increase potential impacts from software vulnerabilities discovered within these systems.
Additional difficulties arise for utilities during the deployment of updates or patches because systems
are so spread out geographically, network bandwidth is limited, or testing environments and procedures
are inadequate. See What the Power Industry Has to Learn About Cyber Vulnerability Disclosure, supra
note 116.
151
Id.
152
Companies also sometimes attempt to silence their critics by threatening suit against the
researchers and academics seeking to stimulate the social conversation around information security.
See, e.g., JONES & SIMONS, supra note 124. Even legal academics working in the information security
space and elite academic presses are not immune from receiving legal correspondence voicing corporate
displeasure over academic speech highlighting histories of vulnerability. See Letter from Timothy
Blank, Dechert LLP, on Behalf of Monster.com, to author (Sept. 24, 2009) (on file with author).
153
What the Power Industry Has to Learn About Cyber Vulnerability Disclosure, supra note 116.
154
Several different methods have been used historically for vulnerability speech. Sometimes
information about vulnerabilities has been released through public mailing lists such as Bugtraq or
websites. Sometimes “responsible vulnerability disclosure” is used. Responsible vulnerability
disclosure generally refers to contacting the author of the vulnerable code and perhaps a computer
emergency response team before engaging in public vulnerability speech to give the author a reasonable
time frame to fix the problem and create a patch before public disclosure. The goal of responsible
disclosure is to minimize the likelihood of an attack exploiting the vulnerability and harming the public
by having a patch available at the time the vulnerability becomes publicly known. Many technology
vendors maintain formal vulnerability management and disclosure policies, acknowledging their
willingness to work with researchers to release fixes in a timely fashion. For example, Microsoft has the
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure practice to document its handling of occurrences. See
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, MICROSOFT SECURITY RESPONSE CENTER, http://www.
microsoft.com/security/msrc/report/disclosure.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). Google acknowledges
and provides a financial reward to researchers who initially disclose the vulnerability information
privately to ensure they can release an appropriate fix before the information is publicly released.
Vulnerability Reward Program, GOOGLE APPLICATION SECURITY, http://www.google.com/about/
company/rewardprogram.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
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aware that some companies may seek to criminally prosecute securityvulnerability researchers in connection with vulnerability speech.155
Perhaps then we should simply offer aggressive protection to all
vulnerability speech and simply carve it out legislatively as protected
speech? Unfortunately, while direct, this approach is neither feasible nor
desirable. The reality of the information security research “scene” is too
nuanced. Although an intellectually vibrant research scene exists in
information security, it is characterized by a high degree of fluidity in the
demographics and motivations of its participants. The community is also
rapidly growing in its size and morphing in its composition.156 The
definition of who is an “information security researcher,” what constitutes
appropriate credentials and skills, 157 and what is “reasonable” conduct in
this space are all malleable constructs; asking different individuals will
generate substantially different answers. 158 Even in the most elite or
“1337” 159 levels of the information security community, disagreements are
increasing over reasonable norms of conduct, and simultaneously,
misunderstandings regarding legal limitations on researcher conduct are
pervasive. Internal ethical differences in the information security
155

The recent case of Andrew “Weev” Auernheimer highlights the tension between computer
security researchers and companies who are willing to criminally prosecute individuals who disclose
security issues in their operations. For a discussion of the Weev case, see, for example, Matt Blaze,
AT&T iPad Hacker’s Real Crime Was Embarrassing the Wrong People, WIRED (Nov. 27, 2012, 6:30
AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/att-ipad-hacker-when-embarassment-becomes-a-crime/.
156
For example, the size of the DEF CON conference dramatically increases each year, with over
6000 people attending in 2011. See Seth Rosenblatt, Attendance: Touring Black Hat and DefCon 2011,
CNET (Aug. 10, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/2300-1009_3-10008941.html.
157
In fact, some job advertisements for elite security jobs specify that the desired applicants should
not be credentialed with the methods that are fast becoming common for new entrants into the
information security space, such as Certified Information Systems Security Professional, or CISSP,
certification. One prospective employer described the qualifications he is seeking in his future
information security employee thusly: “I’m hiring an information security analyst. Must be passionate
about security. Must not have CISSP. Must not wear pants.” Info Security Jerk, @infosecjerk, TWITTER
(Aug. 11, 2012, 9:47 PM), https://twitter.com/infosecjerk/status/234511282559127552.
158
The motivations of researchers in this space vary: a sense of social purpose and altruism
motivates some, desire for fame and individual brand building drives others, and sometimes financial
gain is the motivating factor. Similarly, excluding corporate speakers from the vulnerability speech
ecosystem purely because of their financial motivations would eliminate some of the most important
voices from the information security debate. It is this definitional ambiguity that renders any calls for
blanket statutory protection for vulnerability speech legislatively unworkable. In the words of wellknown information security researcher, Dino Dai Zovi, “ProTip: referring to hackers as a singular group
is like referring to Native Americans as a singular group. Most things aren’t universal.” Dino A. Dai
Zovi, @dinodaizovi, TWITTER (July 30, 2012, 9:09 AM), https://twitter.com/dinodaizovi/status/
229972056203210752. For an argument in favor of statutory protection for security vulnerability
disclosure, see, for example, Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J.
1051, 1083‒86 (2011).
159
“1337” is the hacker slang spelling of “leet” or elite. It is a term of honor bestowed on only the
most skilled members of the hacker community. See 1337, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.
urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=1337 (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
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community are significant, particularly around two issues: first, the issue of
“dropping 0-day,” 160 meaning a release of a zero-day exploit without
offering the author of vulnerable code the opportunity to cure the
deficiencies prior to vulnerability speech; and second, private commercial
sales of zero-day exploits, meaning the sale of vulnerability speech about
previously unknown vulnerabilities to someone other than the author of the
code. 161 Leaving the resolution of these issues solely to the community of
technologists involved in vulnerability speech is, therefore, simply not
feasible. 162 In part because of these rifts and the growing involvement of the
broader (sometimes technology-unsavvy) business community in the code
ecosystem, legal challenges and criminal prosecutions in connection with
vulnerability speech are fast becoming an inevitability. 163 The recent
prosecution and conviction of Andrew “Weev” Auernheimer and the
information security community’s vociferously negative reaction to the
conviction serve as a clear harbinger of legal battles to come with respect to

160

See, e.g., Dear Bruce—On Zero Days, ROGER’S INFO. SECURITY BLOG (Jan. 31, 2012, 5:35
AM), http://www.infosecblog.org/2012/01/dear-bruce-on-zero-days/.
161
Charlie Miller, The Legitimate Vulnerability Market: Inside the Secretive World of 0-Day
Exploit Sales 2 (May 6, 2007), http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/29.pdf (describing the
emergence of a commercial market for zero-day exploits).
162
The dominant perception in the community is that the researcher who found the vulnerability—
like a person who finds a quarter on a deserted street—gets unrestricted dominion over its fate. Yet,
whether this dominion is fettered by certain ethical norms is hotly debated. Not everyone behaves in a
manner similar to the reasonable conduct of Barnaby Jack, his employer, and the ATM company. In the
words of one security researcher:
As a computer security researcher, there are many options available after discovering a
vulnerability in a high-proﬁle application or operating system. She may choose to report the
vulnerability to the vendor, or simply announce it publicly without vendor notiﬁcation. Such a
choice may be made in order to increase her reputation or add to her resume. She may choose to
sell the information on the black market, but faces potential criminal prosecution for such an
action. Finally, she may choose to attempt to sell this information to a legitimate buyer. Such legal
buyers may include government agencies, commercial tool suppliers, large penetration testing and
consulting ﬁrms, intrusion detection companies, and subscription services.
Id.
163
Especially as payment for exploits becomes a dominant approach through “bug bounties,”
“pwn” hacking contests for prize money, and private sales to purchasers (other than the author of the
vulnerable code), the schisms in the community are increasingly apparent. For example, two hacking
contests at the same conference recently reflected the tension over these different community norms: in
one, the contestants were not required to disclose their exploitation techniques, only the details of the
crash that led to the vulnerability; while in a second, contestants were obligated to disclose the details of
the vulnerability as well as their exploit in order to win. Consider the two hacking contests at the
CanSecWest conference in 2012, TippingPoint’s Pwn2Own and Google’s new Pwnium. As part of
Pwn2Own, the contestants did not have to disclose their exploitation techniques or anything other than
the details of the crash that led to the vulnerability. In Google’s Pwnium contest, by contrast,
participants must relinquish the details of the vulnerability as well as the exploit. See Dennis Fisher,
PinkiePie Strikes Again, Compromises Google Chrome in Pwnium Contest at Hack in the Box,
THREAT POST (Oct. 10, 2012, 9:48 AM), http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/pinkiepie-strikes-againcompromises-google-chrome-pwnium-contest-hack-box-101012.
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permissible methods of vulnerability disclosure. 164 Therefore, courts will
likely soon need to resolve the First Amendment status of vulnerability
speech specifically and informational speech generally. With this
impending resolution in mind, the next Part offers one possible approach
for these looming cases, an approach that more directly incorporates
Redish’s notion of “high social value” into an informational speech
framework by using the two factors detailed in the preceding section—the
presence of positive incidental effects and information scarcity.
III. THE REPURPOSED SPEECH SCALE
In 1919, the Supreme Court famously said, “[T]he character of every
act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in
a theatre and causing a panic.” 165 However, sometimes announcing the
existence of a fire in a crowded theater—or identifying a security problem
in a nuclear reactor 166—can result in saving hundreds of lives. The key is
context, specifically the nature of the incidental effects of the speech and
the reasonableness of its time, place, and manner.
In the case of informational speech such as vulnerability speech, the
doctrinal difficulty arises from its possible dual purpose. It is not obvious
how to determine when informational speech aims to contribute to the
public debate and when it constitutes merely a tool to facilitate criminal
164

Auernheimer was prosecuted and convicted of conspiracy to access a computer without
authorization and fraud in connection with personal information. He had discovered a security hole in
an AT&T website that leaked customer information and captured leaking data of over 100,000
subscribers using a script. He then allegedly reported the existence of the hole to the press, but failed to
contact AT&T prior to disclosure in order to provide an opportunity to patch. Nor did he post the
existence of the hole to a mailing list for security vulnerabilities—a commonly used traditional method
of disclosing known vulnerabilities. For a discussion of the facts leading up to the prosecution of
Auernheimer, see, for example, Kim Zetter, Hacker Found Guilty of Breaching AT&T Site to Obtain
iPad Customer Data, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/11/atthacker-found-guilty/; see also Criminal Complaint, United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-4022 (CCC)
(D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/01/SpitlerDaniel-et-al.-Complaint.pdf. For a discussion of the reaction of the information security community,
see, for example, Andrea Peterson, How Convicting a Troll Threatens the Cybersecurity Community,
THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 27, 2012, 7:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/11/27/
1244461/how-convicting-a-troll-threatens-the-cybersecurity-community/?mobile=nc. AT&T’s Chief
Security Officer explained to the press that the data capture was enabled by AT&T’s decision to
prepopulate e-mail addresses to increase customer convenience. See Matt Buchanan, The Little Feature
that Led to AT&T’s iPad Security Breach, GIZMODO (June 19, 2010, 9:19 PM), http://gizmodo.com/
5559686/. Auernheimer is appealing his conviction. See, e.g., Zetter, supra.
165
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citation omitted). Although this portion of
Schenck was likely effectively overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam),
the quote remains well known by the public.
166
See Matthew Harwood, Nuclear Power Plants Vulnerable to Attack, Former CIA Officer Says,
SECURITY MGMT. (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/nuclear-powerplants-vulnerable-attack-former-cia-officer-says-006870.

828

107:795 (2013)

Hacking Speech

conduct. By blending the Redish informational speech approach with the
stronger focus on context that is visible in the harm-based approaches from
the code speech cases and O’Brien, this Part offers a new “repurposed
speech scale” approach to instructional or informational speech. It is an
approach that uses the time, place, and manner of the speaker’s
communication to determine whether the speaker’s dominant
communicative intent 167 was salutary or criminal. Thus, the two hallmark
features of the repurposed speech scale are its contextual sensitivity and its
technology neutrality—a focus on speakers’ reasonable conduct across all
media in mitigating incidental harms arising from their informational
speech.
In the context of vulnerability speech, many security researchers
perceive themselves to be engaging in scientific and academic
commentary, even if they are employed in the private sector. They also
may view themselves as participating in breaking important news on topics
of public interest. Or, depending on their employment situation, they may
see themselves as whistleblowers, 168 alerting the world to unsafe business
practices. 169 In the words of one such disclosing researcher who faced suit
as a result of his disclosure, “I needed to do what’s right for the country
and for the national critical infrastructure.” 170 However, a legally trained
observer—rightly or wrongly—may perceive some security researchers to
be acting as vigilantes or merely as participants in a criminal enterprise. 171
And sometimes researchers’ conduct may indeed cross the line into
illegality. The key is crafting a flexible, technology-neutral standard to
guide researchers’ conduct.

167
Intent is a logical fulcrum in this case because of the structure of criminal law determinations of
responsibility for conduct. For a discussion of criminal intent, see, for example, John F. Decker, The
Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237,
245‒60 (2008).
168
For example, it is likely that when Michael Lynn disclosed the existence of a vulnerability in
Cisco routers—a disclosure that resulted in an FBI probe and suit—he viewed himself to be acting as a
whistleblower. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Whistle-Blower Faces FBI Probe, WIRED (July 29, 2005), http://
www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/07/68356?currentPage=all.
169
For a discussion of the different role of identities of individuals engaging in technology-assisted
disclosure and how it might inform an analysis of the disclosure under the First Amendment, see, for
example, Bellia, supra note 133. However, what researchers sometimes forget is that whistleblowers
frequently face criminal sanctions, despite the social value of their speech. For example, in the
Pentagon Papers case, a criminal prosecution against Daniel Ellsberg continued even though the case
against the New York Times was dismissed. See DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM
AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS 444 (2002); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
170
See Bruce Schneier, Cisco Harasses Security Researcher, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (July 29,
2005, 4:35 AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/cisco_harasses.html.
171
See discussion of the Aurnheimer case, supra note 164.
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A. Combining Code Speech with Informational Speech: The Repurposed
Speech Scale
As I have argued above, the O’Brien approach, 172 which courts have
sometimes applied to code, is actually a good conceptual fit for building a
First Amendment framework for analyzing informational speech and its
negative incidental effects.173 A framework derived from O’Brien presents
courts with flexibility to weigh individualized circumstances in cases
before them, while simultaneously preserving general rubrics of relevant
information as part of a broader framework across cases.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, four factors can be used to create a
repurposed speech scale in order to determine whether a particular type of
informational or instructional speech warrants First Amendment protection,
regardless of its potential repurposing for criminality.
FIGURE 1: THE REPURPOSED SPEECH SCALE FOR
INFORMATIONAL SPEECH
Protected Speech → +1

Unprotected Speech → -1

Stated Goal: Positive
Incidental Effect

Stated Goal: Negative
Incidental Effect

Reputable Public Forum
Selected

Private Forum with High
Risk of Criminality Selected

Scarce Specialized Knowledge

General Knowledge

Reasonable Risk Mitigation

No Risk Mitigation

172

See supra text accompanying notes 94‒97.
A test reliant on determining the functionality of the speech itself rather than its incidental
effects would be a fruitless exercise. In a similar vein, Professor John Hart Ely has argued:
[B]urning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action
and 100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time communication, and no
communication that does not result from conduct. Attempts to determine which element
“predominates” will therefore inevitably degenerate into question-begging judgments about
whether the activity should be protected.
John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975).
173
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, this more general repurposed speech scale can
then be customized to assess the case study of vulnerability speech.174
Specifically, the four factors of the repurposed speech scale are as follows:
(1) whether the stated goal of the speaker identifies an interest in
generating positive incidental effects from the speech or negative incidental
effects from the speech, regardless of the content of the speech; (2) whether
the speaker selects a reputable forum in the public eye for his speech, in
lieu of a private forum where criminality is the more likely result;
(3) whether the speech represents scarce specialized knowledge possessed
by only a few experts or whether the speech reflects easily available
general knowledge; and (4) whether the speaker has engaged in reasonable
risk mitigation steps in order to limit the potential negative incidental
effects of his speech. The presence of each of these factors means a high
score, the absence a low score. These four factors should be analyzed
concurrently and tallied together in order to create an overall assessment of
the speaker’s objective communicative intent—either one more in line with
furthering debate 175 or one more in line with furthering criminality. 176 A
high score on the scale indicates the appropriateness of First Amendment
protection for the speech. A low score signals a likelihood of criminal
intent and inappropriateness of First Amendment protection. A score in the
middle should be construed in favor of First Amendment protection for the
informational speech, erring on the side of overprotection to avoid chilling
future speech.

174
Professor David McGowan has correctly argued that to the extent code facilitates unlawful
behavior, it should be covered under incitement, which requires that the state demonstrate a likelihood
that an act will cause harm in order to justify its regulation. See McGowan, supra note 43, at 1576‒78.
Lee Tien similarly explains that:
There’s no doubt that the actor is speaking, but he might “also” or “really” be doing something
else. . . . Crucially, Alice’s act of publishing her software in itself causes no harm. The fear is that
others may use her software to cause harm. The risk of harm is difficult to distinguish from that
associated with the publication of many kinds of information.
In short, there’s nothing special about software for purposes of First Amendment coverage.
The First Amendment need not be “extended” for software to be covered as “speech.”
Tien, supra note 41, at 635‒36.
175
This concern was highlighted by the Second Circuit in Commodities Future Trading
Commission v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 109‒12 (2d Cir. 2000).
176
As Lee Tien explains, “Even if the virus author merely posts the source code and fails to release
it in active form, the issue remains whether the posting was done with an intent to communicate. . . .
There is no question that people study viruses and other dangerous software in order to prevent or
relieve harm. . . . When such publications aim to alert the world to these dangers, their intent is clearly
communicative.” Tien, supra note 41, at 675‒76.
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FIGURE 2: THE REPURPOSED SPEECH SCALE FOR INFORMATIONAL SPEECH: APPLICATION TO
VULNERABILITY SPEECH
Protected Speech → +1

Unprotected Speech → -1

Stated Goal: Cause
Improvement in Information
Security

Stated Goal: Cause
Exploitation of Vulnerability

Reputable General Purpose /
Information Security
Publication, Conference, or
Forum Selected

Private Forum with High Risk
of Criminality Selected;
Private Sale Not to Author

Disclosure of Zero Day by
Expert

Reuse of Previously Known
Vulnerabilities by Novice

Contacting Author, Delaying
Publication, Writing Proof of
Concept Code, Avoiding
Maximum Weaponization,
Etc.

“Dropping 0-Day” Exploits
Without Notice to the Code
Author; Unwilling to
Cooperate

1.

The Speaker’s Goal and the Incidental Effects of the
Informational Speech.—The first factor asks whether the
speaker’s self-identified communicative goal relates to positive incidental
effects expected to arise from the speech. In other words, it includes a
subjective intent assessment from the perspective of the speaker. In this
manner, the scale is informed by case law that defines incitement in terms
of both the speaker’s intent and the act’s likely effect, but not the content of
the speech itself. This first factor incorporates the spirit of Redish’s first
and second informational speech factors through asking the speaker for his
perception of the likely positive or negative incidental effects of his
speech. 177 Further, this factor picks up on the notion of intent articulated in
O’Brien, that “the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea,” 178 and it seeks to ascertain what that idea was from the
subjective perspective of the speaker. Returning to Rice v. Paladin179 and
the criminal intent stipulation therein, this factor differentiates cases where

177
178
179

832

See Redish, supra note 7, at 90.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
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speakers directly express interest in furthering criminality from those cases
where criminality is merely an unfortunate byproduct of a well-intentioned,
socially concerned speaker. In other words, this factor differentiates singlepurpose informational speech, which primarily facilitates criminality, from
dual-purpose informational speech, which might incidentally further
criminality but the primary purpose of which is to push forward debate on
matters of public concern.
Applying this first factor of the repurposed speech scale approach—
whether the stated goal of the speaker is generating positive incidental
effects with his speech—to the case study of vulnerability speech, courts
would look to the asserted rationale behind an information security
researcher’s vulnerability disclosure. Subjectively, from the perspective of
the information security researcher, the court would ask whether the goal of
the disclosure was to improve the state of information security in society
and to protect consumers or national security from harm. Therefore, an
assertion of a deep concern over mitigating information vulnerability and
improving the integrity of code would afford this speech a high score on
this factor in the scale. However, a stipulation by the researcher that the
purpose of a particular disclosure is to facilitate the criminal exploitation of
vulnerabilities would afford this speech a low score on this factor in the
scale. 180
2. The Reputation of the Speaker’s Selected Forum.—The second
element incorporated into the repurposed speech scale relates to the
particular forum the speaker selects for his speech. If the speaker selects a
highly reputable forum in the public eye—a forum where his speech is
likely to stimulate social debate—this forum selection would earn the
speech a high score on this second factor of the scale. However, if the
speaker selects a private forum for his speech, particularly a private forum
known for a high risk of criminality, this removal of his speech from the
public space for debate would warrant a low score for this factor. This
factor reflects a transformation of Redish’s first and second factors,
refocusing them more on the context of the speech and the known audience

180
In other words, courts would not look to objective indicators of intent but rather to the speaker’s
subjective asserted rationale for the disclosure as previously asserted to the media, in the record or
through testimony at the time of trial. This factor gives the benefit of the doubt to the speaker by design.
For example, the motivations of many information security researchers looking into election systems
have been articulated by Professor Edward Felten: “We have created and analyzed the code in the spirit
of helping to guide public officials so that they can make wise decisions about how to secure elections.”
Teresa Riordan, Researchers Reveal ‘Extremely Serious’ Vulnerabilities in E-Voting Machines, NEWS
AT PRINCETON (Sept. 13, 2006, 12:46 PM), http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S15/81/
65O23/index.xml?section=topstories. Corporate researchers who conduct research on election software
frequently volunteer their time to do so. They are frequently driven by a sense of concern for preserving
the integrity of the electoral process and the future of our electoral system.
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present in that context. 181 Taking speech out of the public eye limits the
possibility for stimulating debate; in the opinion of at least some courts, the
public eye renders speech less threatening and less dangerous. 182
In the context of vulnerability speech, applying the second factor of
the scale, whether the speaker selected a reputable forum in the public eye
or a private forum with a high risk of criminality, means that an
information security researcher who chooses to engage in a vulnerability
disclosure in a respected information security publication or chooses to
present his research at a major information security conference is selecting
a reputable forum. His choice of forum offers wide exposure for his
research in a manner likely to stimulate debate both inside the information
security community and in the public at large. In other words, he creates a
situation where debate and counterspeech can occur. Therefore, the choice
of a forum in the public eye means the communication deserves a high
score on this factor of the scale. If, however, a researcher selects to limit
access to his speech by sharing only in a private forum or in a forum where
the audience is predominantly composed of reputed cybercriminals, this
researcher chooses to target a different kind of audience for his speech—
one more likely to be interested in using his research for criminality rather
than the furtherance of public debate. Similarly, if a researcher chooses to
sell his exploits in private sales, 183 the researcher is choosing to remove his
speech from the public debate rather than to contribute it to society.
Consequently, this communication in a private forum would mean a low
score for the speech on this factor in the scale. Why is this the case? In the
words of Professor Dan Burk, the debate over code and speech invokes
181
See Redish, supra note 7, at 90. This prong also incorporates insights from Volokh’s first prong.
Professor Kent Greenawalt has also highlighted the distinction between public and private
communications, explaining that “justifications for free speech . . . do not reach communications that
are simply means to get a crime successfully committed.” KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND
THE USES OF LANGUAGE 85 (1989). Greenawalt asserts that public advocacy, meaning advocacy that
refers to a “right, overall welfare, or some historical, philosophical, political, or religious view,” has
substantial value as expression as it reflects an effort to persuade the public of the wisdom of a
particular course of action or view rather than an attempt to convince a person or a group of persons to
commit a crime. Id. at 261.
182
See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1288 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (holding
that drug defendants with a website of “wanted” agents were not enough of an “imminent” threat for a
protective order because there was no evidence that the communication “authorized, ratified, or directly
threatened acts of violence,” and the public nature of the communication supported this conclusion
(quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929 (1982))); Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 1135, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (holding that when the operator of a website critical of law
enforcement challenged a statute regarding publishing personal information of officers, release of the
information, without more, does not constitute a true threat). As Justice Brandeis explained, “If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech . . . .” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
183
I refer here to situations other than receiving a bug bounty from the author of the vulnerable
code.
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“the venerable literary debate as to whether text constitutes Logos—a thing
said, or Poiema—a thing made.” 184 As vulnerability speech becomes
private and commodified in sale, it starts to resemble a “thing made” more
than speech, and consequently it renders itself more regulable as a
potentially dangerous product less worthy of First Amendment
protection. 185
For example, in 2012, a teen using the handle Pinkie Pie won the
Google Pwnium contest 186 and triumphantly caused the Chrome browser to
redirect to a website emblazoned with his symbol—a pink My Little Pony
image. 187 Google awarded Pinkie Pie $60,000 in prize money, Pinkie Pie
explained his exploit, and Google thanked him for his good work, which it
applied to correct its browser’s security issue. 188 Meanwhile, at the same
conference where Pinky Pie’s My Little Pony proudly trumpeted his
achievement in Pwnium, a team from the security firm Vupen discovered a
flaw in another Google product. 189 However, unlike Pinky Pie, who was
glad to contribute to improving the product, and thus information security
in general, Vupen’s motivations appeared to involve no interest in
improving the product’s security or contributing to the public debate over
information security in the United States: according to the chief executive
of this company, the company “wouldn’t share this with Google for even
$1 million.” 190 He continued, “We don’t want to give them any knowledge
that can help them in fixing this exploit or other similar exploits. We want
to keep this for our customers.” 191 Applying the chosen forum factor to
these two instances of vulnerability speech, while Pinkie Pie’s speech
demonstrates an interest in sharing the information in a reputable public
184

Burk, supra note 41, at 120.
Contract law doctrines with respect to permissible subject matter and public policy would
support setting aside contracts for sales of vulnerabilities as potentially unenforceable. Further, sales of
attacks that exploit vulnerabilities are likely regulable on grounds of interstate commerce and national
defense.
186
See Kim Zetter, Teen Exploits Three Zero-Day Vulns for $60K Win in Google Chrome Hack
Contest, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (Mar. 9, 2012, 7:37 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/
03/zero-days-for-chrome/.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
See Vupen Strikes Again: French Team Cracks IE 9 in Pwn2Own Hack Contest, INFO SECURITY
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/24441/vupen-strikes-again-french-teamcracks-ie-9-in-pwn2own-hack-contest/.
190
Andy Greenberg, The Zero-Day Salesmen, FORBES, Apr. 9, 2012, at 40, 42. In a rather public
Twitter spat with Google, Vupen released a video showing that it could penetrate a machine running
Chrome but provided no information to Google that facilitated correcting the vulnerability. Google
responded by identifying a possible source of the problem. Vupen then accused Google of downplaying
its vulnerabilities and called it “pathetic.” Id. at 44. As might be expected, this Twitter barb triggered a
retort from Google security staffers who condemned Vupen for disregarding users’ privacy and called
Vupen’s CEO an “ethically challenged opportunist.” Id.
191
Id. at 42. Analysts have asserted that Vupen’s clients pay around $100,000 annually for a
subscription plan, “which gives them the privilege of shopping for Vupen’s techniques.” Id.
185
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forum to improve a vulnerable product, Vupen’s vulnerability speech takes
the information out of the public eye and would score lower on this factor
in the repurposed speech scale.
3. The Scarcity of the Speaker’s Contributed Knowledge.—The third
factor in the repurposed speech scale relates to the scarcity or pervasiveness
of the knowledge contributed by the speech. As Part II explained, although
perhaps it is counterintuitive, information that is known only by a small,
specialized group of experts, if shared, may be most likely to contribute
novel arguments to the public debate.192 Consequently, the willingness of
experts to contribute their skills for the purposes of furthering a social
policy debate constitutes a high-value type of speech 193 deserving a high
score on this factor in the scale, even in instances where the speech can be
repurposed to facilitate criminal activity. However, in line with the court’s
analysis in Rice v. Paladin, if the knowledge contributed by the speech is
already easily accessible to members of the public and it simultaneously
heightens the possibility of criminality, this type of general knowledge
speech is more appropriately scored with a low value on this factor in the
scale. It is unlikely to contribute meaningfully to the public debate. This
third factor is an inversion of Redish’s third factor relating to information
availability: while Redish asserted that information already publicly
available should trigger a higher level of protection,194 I would assert the
contrary. Because of the potential high social value and its simultaneous
scarcity, commentary by experts with specialized knowledge may warrant
higher levels of protection in the context of informational speech than, for
example, a mere aggregation of readily available Internet information
reflecting only the “sweat of the brow” of a novice. In this way, it might be
argued that Redish’s fourth factor, the potential value to the public of the
revealed information, is implicitly incorporated within this third factor of
the repurposed speech scale.
In the context of vulnerability speech, this third factor—whether the
knowledge constitutes scarce, specialized knowledge or generally available
knowledge—would translate into affording the public disclosure of zeroday exploits by information security experts a high score on this factor in
the scale. For example, the ability of an information security researcher to
examine a voting machine and, in only a few hours, compromise the
integrity of a mock election is a skill held by a relatively small number of
researchers. Yet, having this informational speech contributed to the public
debate over the desirability of electronic voting machines is of paramount
192
Courts frequently look to experts to guide the determination of disputes in cases. Here, it can be
argued that society benefits through encouraging experts to contribute their esoteric knowledge pro
bono to the public conversation around issues of social importance. Thus, a thumb on the judicial scale
in favor of expertise and specialized knowledge is not a radical suggestion.
193
Information value is driven by scarcity. See supra notes 135‒39.
194
See Redish, supra note 7, at 90‒91.
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importance. Meanwhile, the mere aggregation or republication of known
vulnerabilities and exploit code would receive a low score for this factor:
the risks outweigh the novelty of the contribution to the social
conversation.
4.

The Speaker’s Reasonable Risk Mitigation of Negative Incidental
Effects.—Finally the fourth factor in the scale, the extent of
reasonable risk mitigation 195 by the speaker, asks whether the speaker
considered and actively sought to minimize likely negative incidental
effects 196 that would result from his speech. In circumstances where
evidence exists that the speaker used reasonable care to mitigate against the
possible harms arising from the time, place, and manner of his speech,197
these reasonable efforts would mean a high score on this factor in the scale.
If, however, the speaker chose to ignore available reasonable measures for
mitigating the possible damaging impacts of his speech and proceeded to
speak in a manner demonstrating disregard of any likely harm, this lack of
care would mean a low score on this factor.198 Thus, this factor is an
offshoot of Redish’s first and second factors relating to the likelihood and
severity of potential criminality that may result, but reframes them using
the language of O’Brien. 199
In the context of vulnerability speech, the fourth factor relating to
reasonable risk mitigation would be operationalized by analyzing whether
the researcher limited damage likely to be caused because of his
vulnerability disclosure and exploit. In other words, to what extent was the
researcher willing to take affirmative steps to minimize the likelihood that
criminal exploitation of the discovered vulnerability will occur? Because
the researcher sits in the optimal position to analyze the avenues of possible
harm resulting from his vulnerability speech, the researcher is in the best
195

In response to this type of argument, prior scholarship has also argued that unlike other code,
compiled malicious programs raise different issues because they are functioning. See Tien, supra note
41, at 669‒70. As such, a compiled exploit arguably may be more closely akin to a weapon such as a
bomb than to a book or a pamphlet, with the sole purpose of causing harm. Some authors argue that:
[P]osting code is like leaving a loaded gun out on a windowsill: if someone picks up the gun and
shoots a puppy, the liability of the gun owner is not assessed under incitement law. This is true
even if the gun owner left the gun for communicative purposes—to show off the stock, or protest
antigun laws.
John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1375 (2008).
196
In other words, the assessment is an analysis of harm minimization.
197
This analysis is not an analysis of the content of the speech, merely its negative and positive
incidental effects.
198
For example, in the Hustler case, the publisher included meaningful cautionary language as part
of an article discussing high-risk activities to mitigate the risk of a reader attempting the activities
described. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987).
199
Although temporal proximity between an initial communication and harm has traditionally been
considered in incitement analysis, today’s reality of mixed media in communications complicates a
linear temporal analysis. This is because services such as YouTube arguably preserve at least a portion
of the potency of a live interaction long after its occurrence in physical space.
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position to engage in the first round of mitigation against these harms. For
example, courts might look to whether the researcher was willing to
cooperate with the author of the vulnerable code in order to correct the
vulnerability both before and after his vulnerability speech. A court might
also ask whether the researcher wrote proof of concept code in a manner to
intentionally minimize the possible extent of exploitability or
weaponization of the vulnerability in the course of proving its existence.200
If, however, the researcher seemed to be simply interested in the
reputational glory of “dropping 0-day” 201 and was unwilling to reasonably
cooperate with or notify the author of the code prior to releasing exploit
code into the wild, these actions would push the speech toward a low score
on this factor in the scale.
For example, in 2009, researchers from the security firm IOActive
found a series of vulnerabilities inside smart grid technologies. Although
they identified the vulnerable technologies in question, because their goal
was to stimulate conversation inside the security research community and
to catalyze SCADA 202 security improvements, 203 they did not disclose the
identities of the particular companies whose products contained the
vulnerabilities: they were cautious to limit the risk of active exploitation of
the vulnerabilities. 204 However, as later vulnerability disclosure in the
SCADA space demonstrates, this approach is not always the norm, and
tensions have arisen inside the information security community that will
inevitably end in the courts. For example, a different team of researchers
from a different security firm, citing frustrations with smart grid vendors’
lack of effort to improve security, handled smart grid vulnerability
disclosure in a substantially different manner: not only did the team
reportedly publicly identify the numerous vulnerabilities and vendors in
question, 205 but they also apparently developed and made available the
200

See, e.g., Microsoft Security Advisory (921923): Proof of Concept Code Published Affecting the
Remote Access Connection Manager Service, MICROSOFT SECURITY TECHCENTER (June 23, 2006),
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/921923?.
201
See, e.g., id.
202
See OFFICE OF THE MANAGER, NAT’L COMMC’NS SYS., TECHNICAL INFORMATION BULLETIN
04-1: SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION (SCADA) SYSTEMS (2004), available at http://
www.ncs.gov/library/tech_bulletins/2004/tib_04-1.pdf.
203
In particular, the researchers had focused on the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI),
devices that monitor and control the use of energy in homes and businesses. Approximately 2 million of
the devices had been deployed at the time of the discovery, and an estimated 17 million devices had
allegedly been ordered by utilities. Robert Lemos, Smart-Grid Firms Need Security Education,
SECURITYFOCUS (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/932.
204
See id.; see also Interview with Robert Zigweid, Principle Compliance Consultant for IOActive,
in Las Vegas, Nev. (July 27, 2012) (notes on file with author).
205
According to press reports, the vulnerabilities were found in widely used programmable logic
controllers made by General Electric, Rockwell Automation, Schneider Modicon, Koyo Electronics,
and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. See Kim Zetter, Hoping to Teach a Lesson, Researchers
Release Exploits for Critical Infrastructure Software, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (Jan. 19, 2012, 7:23
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exploit code 206 required to take advantage of the vulnerabilities without
giving the vendors who authored the code or Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) ICS-CERT 207 a chance to intervene and patch it.208 The
researchers asserted that they “didn’t want a vendor to jump out in front of
the announcement with a PR campaign to convince customers that it wasn’t
an issue they should be concerned with.”209 Taking this researcher’s
commentary at face value, the team chose to release the exploit code in lieu
of first allowing a public conversation to happen about the vulnerabilities:
the team appears to have anticipated that if the products were actively
compromised by malicious attackers, the conversation would be short
circuited. From the perspective of some officials in the DHS, by releasing
exploits before vendors and customers could mitigate the vulnerabilities,
these researchers unnecessarily exposed the systems to attack by low-level
hackers. 210 While the IOActive vulnerability speech clearly demonstrates an

PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/scada-exploits/; see also Andy Bochman, Attention
Electric Sector: Wired Reports SCADA Exploits in the Wild, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Technologies_Security/Attention-electric-sector-Wiredreports-SCADA-exploits-in-the-wild-4404.html#.UHB7XNWs16Y. These controllers are used in
industrial control systems “to control functions in critical infrastructure such as water, power and
chemical plants; gas pipelines and nuclear facilities; as well as in manufacturing facilities such as food
processing plants and automobile and aircraft assembly lines.” Zetter, supra.
206
The researchers released exploit modules using a tool called Metasploit. Metasploit is a tool
used by computer security professionals to test if their networks contain specific vulnerabilities, but it is
also an exploit tool used by malicious hackers to find and gain access to vulnerable systems. The
vulnerabilities included backdoors, lack of authentication and encryption, and weak password storage
that would allow attackers to gain access to the systems. “The security weaknesses also ma[d]e it
possible to send malicious commands to the devices in order to crash or halt them, and to interfere with
specific critical processes controlled by them, such as the opening and closing of valves.” Id.; see also
About Metasploit, METASPLOIT, http://www.metasploit.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
207
ICS-CERT is the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team housed in the
Department of Homeland Security. See The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT), ICS-CERT, http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/ics-cert/ (last visited Mar. 21,
2012). It explains its role as a team that
coordinates control systems-related security incidents and information sharing with Federal, State,
and local agencies and organizations, the intelligence community, and private sector constituents,
including vendors, owners and operators, and international and private sector CERTs. The focus
on control systems cybersecurity provides a direct path for coordination of activities among all
members of the critical infrastructure stakeholder community.
More Information About the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, ICS-CERT,
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/ics-cert/more_information.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
208
See Bochman, supra note 205. According to one of the lead researchers on the team, “a large
percentage of the vulnerabilities the researchers found were basic vulnerabilities that were already
known to the vendors, and that the vendors had simply ‘chosen to live with’ them rather than do
anything to fix them.” Id.
209
Zetter, supra note 205. Wightman and Peterson, two of the researchers who uncovered the
vulnerabilities, allegedly said they wanted to avoid companies issuing statements to customers
downplaying the vulnerabilities. Id.
210
“‘We have so many of these little scriptkiddies that are looking at these things and that are
associating themselves with these anarchist groups,’ said the official, who talked to Wired on condition
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attempt to mitigate harm and would receive a high score on this mitigation
factor of the scale, the second company’s vulnerability speech does not
show signs of reasonable mitigation on its face and would likely warrant a
low score on this factor. 211
B. The Two Implementations
Two possible vulnerability speech First Amendment scenarios are
likely to arise where courts may reach for an instructional or informational
speech approach such as the repurposed speech scale described above. The
first situation likely to arise relates to a First Amendment challenge to an
act of Congress which meaningfully limits the ability of speakers to engage
in instructional or informational speech on topics that implicate national
security concerns. The second scenario involves criminal prosecutions in
connection with instructional or informational speech.
1. Congressional Action Prohibiting Vulnerability Speech.—In the
age of Stuxnet 212 and the progressive weaponization of vulnerabilities for
national security and offensive use, Congress is demonstrating interest in
new “cybersecurity” legislation. 213 In particular, it is likely that private sales
of exploits to parties other than the author of vulnerable code will be
legislatively prohibited for national security reasons—a prohibition that
could potentially overreach and limit security vulnerability research
generally. The legal questions around regulating the sales of exploits reflect
the underlying tension presciently identified by Professor Dan Farber over
a decade ago regarding the erosion of the boundary between commerce and
speech. 214

that his name not be used since he was not authorized to speak to the press. ‘They want to create
problems, and they’re just trying to figure out how. And that’s very concerning.’” Id.
211
Other security researchers also raise concerns about this idea of “teaching a lesson” to authors
of vulnerable code by releasing exploits, noting that this approach is controversial. In the words of one
researcher, “I would never think about releasing this stuff.” Id.
212
See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Confirmed: US and Israel Created Stuxnet, Lost Control of It, ARS
TECHNICA (June 1, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israelcreated-stuxnet-lost-control-of-it/.
213
For example, Congress has already placed restrictions on hyperlinking. See H. Brian Holland,
Inherently Dangerous: The Potential for an Internet-Specific Standard Restricting Speech that
Performs a Teaching Function, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 356‒66 (2005); see also 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)
(2006) (criminalizing the distribution, including through the Internet, of bomb-making instructions). As
such, hyperlinking to a website is prohibited to the extent that it constitutes a distribution of information
that pertains to the manufacture or use of an explosive device with knowledge that the information
receiver will use that information to violate federal law. See, e.g., Holland, supra, at 367. In one case,
an eighteen-year-old was prosecuted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act for
posting mirrored informational materials from other websites, which included instructional information
about defeating police tactics and bomb making. See id. at 366‒72. The prosecution resulted in a plea
bargain and a sentence of one year in prison. See id. at 370‒71.
214
See Farber, supra note 57.
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According to press accounts, a vibrant gray market has emerged in
zero-day exploits. A single zero-day exploit sometimes now sells for as
much as $200,000. 215 Although some researchers have long sold exploits, a
marked shift appears to have happened just in the last year in the dynamics
of the information security community with respect to the prevalence of
exploits for sale. 216 Purchasers’ uses of the exploits vary and are not traced:
some purchasers are governments who use the exploits for spying purposes,
while other purchasers may be companies who use the exploits for
marketing. Still other purchasers in this vulnerability marketplace are
companies who provide a subscription security service to clients,217 defense
contractors, 218 and companies and individuals who act as intermediaries for
private buyers. 219 While some security commentators argue in favor of
banning exploit sales entirely, 220 intermediaries argue that the prohibition
would be fruitless and simply militarily disadvantage the United States in
the international marketplace. 221 Many members of the information security
community appear to view this as merely an “ethical” difference: they fail
to acknowledge the potentially serious legal and national security
implications that may accompany U.S. researchers selling zero-day exploits

215

See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 190, at 44. As explained by one security researcher who
advocates selling exploits, “There is strong evidence that . . . researchers are now motivated more by
monetary gain than prestige.” Miller, supra note 161. Miller continues,
There has long been a black market for computer exploits. For a long time, hackers were
content to trade or sell exploits amongst themselves, mostly for prestige. Computer security
researchers normally followed “responsible” disclosure which entails contacting the vendor and
usually receiving acknowledgment when the vulnerability was announced along with the supplied
patch. In the last few years, the market for 0-day exploits, those for which there is no available
patch, has begun to migrate into the commercial space.
Id.
216
According to at least one participant, the exploit gray market has “exploded” in the last year: in
the words of this intermediary, there are now “more buyers, deeper pockets,” the time for a purchase
has accelerated from months to weeks, and sellers frequently have twelve to fourteen zero-day exploits
every month compared to just four to six a few years ago. See Andy Greenberg, Shopping
For Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers’ Secret Software Exploits, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2012, 9:43
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-forhackers-secret-software-exploits/. One single browser exploit sold for $125,000. Id.
217
Firms include TippingPoint, Snosoft, and iDefense. Additional players in the exploit sale
industry include smaller firms like Vupen, Endgame, and Netragard. Id.
218
Northrop Grumman and Raytheon are examples. Id.
219
These intermediaries are not always U.S. citizens or interested in preserving the national
security of the United States. See id.
220
In the words of one security researcher, Chris Soghoian, industry self-regulation is needed:
“Security researchers should not be selling zero-days to middle man firms . . . These firms are cowboys
and if we do nothing to stop them, they will drag the entire security industry into a world of pain.” Id.
221
On the other hand, intermediaries argue, sales of vulnerabilities are inevitable—just like sales of
guns: by failing to participate and outlawing the practice, the United States would only disadvantage
itself and its companies. See id.
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to foreign governments. 222 However, even prominent proponents of
vulnerability markets are becoming concerned: in the words of one such
researcher, “The fact that the market for vulnerability information favors
selling to governments is terrible and needs to be addressed.” 223 Exploit
sales to foreign countries may quickly become the treason of the 21st
century. In the words of one exploit intermediary, “Realistically, we’re
selling cyberweaponry.” 224
Yet, in the name of protecting national security, particularly with
respect to these problematic vulnerability markets, “cybersecurity”
legislation may be drafted with overly aggressive language. In such a case,
the new legislation might be construed to limit the ability of vulnerability
researchers to engage in vulnerability speech in forums in the public eye or
even to approach companies with knowledge of vulnerabilities, hoping to
assist them in information security improvements to products. While a
narrowly crafted legislative prohibition on vulnerability sales to foreign
governments that threaten U.S. national security interests would likely
survive First Amendment scrutiny, overly broad legislative crafting should
not be allowed to limit vulnerability speech protectable under the
repurposed speech scale.
2. Criminal Prosecutions.—As the previous sections have explained,
fundamental social interests are at stake in improving information security
in our democratic process and economy. As the monetary stakes in the
business of information security and public awareness of security breaches
increase, litigation over vulnerability speech becomes progressively more
likely. Further, as the participants in the information security ecosystem
increase in number, it also becomes more likely that disclosed exploits will
be used by criminals, potentially leading to a criminal prosecution of the
researchers who discovered the vulnerabilities for aiding and abetting225 or
222
See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Researchers Seek Help Cracking Gauss Mystery Payload, WIRED
THREAT LEVEL (Aug. 14, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/08/gaussmystery-payload/.
223
Charlie Miller, @0xcharlie, TWITTER (Aug. 14, 2012, 8:47 AM), https://twitter.com/0xcharlie/
status/235402152716152834.
224
See the comments of Netragard’s founder, Adriel Desautels, in Greenberg, supra note 216.
However, these “cyberwar” scenarios are not the only information security dynamics that may trigger a
need for an informational speech analysis. Another such possible scenario might involve people who
post instructions or useful information in forums frequented by members of “hacktivist” collectives
such as Anonymous.
225
According to the Model Penal Code, an accomplice has “the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (1985). The aider must
have the purpose of abetting a specifically identifiable crime and an underlying offense must occur in
order to hold the aider criminally responsible.For discussions of aiding and abetting in various contexts,
see, for example, Andrei Mamolea, The Future of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 109‒11 (2011); Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil
Liability for Aiding and Abetting: Should Lawyers Be “Privileged” to Assist Their Clients’
Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE L. REV. 75 (2008); and Angela Walker, Note, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel:

842

107:795 (2013)

Hacking Speech

conspiring 226 in the criminal act. Other possible criminal charges arising out
of vulnerability speech could implicate economic espionage, 227 identity
theft or fraud, 228 and even treason, 229 depending on the circumstances.230 For
example, a finder of security vulnerabilities may engage in vulnerability
speech in a manner that angers or embarrasses a company with a vulnerable
system or product, leading to the prosecution of that individual.231
Alternatively, the heightened social concern over “cyberwar” and
information security may also lead to an increase in criminal prosecutions
for aiding and abetting 232 or conspiring to commit computer intrusion in
connection with vulnerability speech. 233 In particular, this situation may
arise if an information security researcher sells an exploit, leveraging a
vulnerability directly or indirectly to a foreign government, and that
government subsequently uses the researcher’s exploit to inflict harm to the
United States and its citizens. 234
Under the Alien Tort Statute the Mens Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Is Knowledge,
10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 119 (2011).226 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); see, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy
& Gregory I. Massing, The Model Penal Code’s Wrong Turn: Renunciation as a Defense to Criminal
Conspiracy, 64 FLA. L. REV. 353 (2012); Julia N. Sarnoff, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 48 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 663 (2011).
226
See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); see, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy & Gregory I. Massing, The Model
Penal Code’s Wrong Turn: Renunciation as a Defense to Criminal Conspiracy, 64 FLA. L. REV. 353
(2012); Julia N. Sarnoff, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 663 (2011).
227
For example, a company may allege that an employee who discloses the existence of a security
vulnerability in a product and refers to proprietary information to prove the flaw’s existence may be
participating in a scheme to steal critical intellectual property for the benefit of a foreign competitor.
See Recent Case, Criminal Law—United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2011), cert denied,
No. 11-1141, 2012 WL 929750 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012), 125 HARV. L. REV. 2177, 2181‒84 (2012)
(advocating an “expansive” reading of the Act and characterizing, ominously for security researchers,
cyberspace as a budding venue for economic espionage); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When
Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791 (2011).
228
See, e.g., discussion of the Auernheimer case supra note 164.
229
For a discussion of treason, see, for example, Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of
Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1447‒62 (2009).
230
For example, if a zero-day exploit sold by a U.S. researcher is used by a foreign government
against the United States, a treason prosecution of the researcher may arise. See id. at 1458‒61.
231
Some computer security experts construe the criminal prosecution of Andrew “Weev”
Auernheimer to reflect such a dynamic. See, e.g., Blaze, supra note 155.
232
The Model Penal Code provides that an aider must have “the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (1985).
233
Intentionally absent from this list are intellectual property harms. DMCA anticircumvention
provisions require congressional and judicial reexamination. I would argue that the harm is not in
circumvention but in the unauthorized use of the underlying code. The flaws of the DMCA
anticircumvention provisions are outside the scope of this Article. For another scholar’s critique of the
DMCA, see, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, I Put You There: User-Generated Content and
Anticircumvention, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889, 906‒12 (2010).
234
Allegations currently exist on Twitter that U.S. security researchers are selling exploits to
foreign governments, including China. See, e.g., Andrew Auernheimer, @rabite, TWITTER (Aug. 4,
2012, 1:01 PM), https://twitter.com/rabite/status/231842389382295553 (“I don’t think exploit control
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Finally, another pressing reason for the United States to clarify its
position on vulnerability speech and informational speech in general relates
to a looming international extradition and dual criminality problem. The
extent of protection offered to U.S. researchers by the First Amendment
likely conflicts with currently emerging law on vulnerability research in
other countries. 235 As a consequence, in the future, U.S. researchers may be
arrested when they travel or work abroad because of their research—
research legal in the United States but potentially illegal in other countries.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a novel First Amendment approach to
instructional or informational speech—the repurposed speech scale—
through using the case study of vulnerability speech. The repurposed
speech scale examines four factors in order to synthetically create an
objective determination of a speaker’s communicative intent in
informational speech—the speaker’s subjective goal behind the
informational speech, the reputation of the forum selected for the speech,
the degree of scarcity of the contributed information, and the extent of
mandates legislation but we shouldn’t act as if @daveaitel sellin [sic] exploits to the Chinese is
anything but vile[.]”).
235
The First Amendment provides U.S. citizens stronger free speech protections than the average
level of protection granted by EU member state constitutions. Recently, legislative proposals in the
Council of Europe have indicated an interest in criminalizing certain forms of security vulnerability
research, specifically research done without the consent of a code’s author. See Katitza Rodriguez &
Marcia Hofmann, Coders’ Rights at Risk in the European Parliament, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION DEEPLINKS BLOG (June 20, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/06/eff-europeanparliament-directive-attack-information-systems. The social policy reasons articulated in the previous
section dictate that most security vulnerability research be protected and encouraged in the United
States. As such, without a doctrinally coherent and thoughtful position on questions of vulnerability
speech from the courts, it is possible that U.S. citizens engaging in vulnerability research entirely lawful
in the United States may end up wrongly facing criminal prosecution in the European Union. See
Rebecca Bowe, Note to European Parliament: Let Security Researches Do Their Thing, Reap Public
Benefits, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION DEEPLINKS BLOG (June 25, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/06/note-european-parliament-let-security-researchers-do-their-thing
-reap-public. Particularly because the United States is adopting an aggressive stance in requesting
extradition of U.K. nationals who have been linked to allegedly copyright infringing materials, it is
likely that the U.K. and EU will expect reciprocity in extradition. In this way, a scenario could arise that
reflects an inversion of the facts in United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
In that case, a Russian citizen employed by a Russian company, Dmitry Sklyarov, was arrested at a
computer conference in the United States for allegedly violating the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act—a law which did not have a corollary in Russia where he authored the code at issue. See Pretrial
Diversion Agreement, United States v. Sklyarov, No. CR 01-20138 RMW, 2001 WL 34131404 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 13, 2001); Adobe FAQ: ElcomSoft Legal Background, ADOBE, http://www.adobe.com/
aboutadobe/pressroom/pressreleases/200108/elcomsoftqa.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). For a
discussion of recent U.S. extradition requests for criminal copyright infringement, see, for example,
Nate Anderson, Copyright Wars Heat Up: US Wins Extradition of College Kid from England, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 13, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/03/copyright-wars-heatup-us-wins-extradition-of-college-kid-from-england/.
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reasonable risk mitigation by the speaker. Tallying these factors in order to
determine a speaker’s objective dominant communicative intent, in
situations where that intent demonstrates a desire to contribute to discourse
on topics of public concern, that speech warrants First Amendment
protection. However, in situations where a speaker’s dominant
communicative intent tends to indicate a goal of contributing to criminality,
the speech does not warrant First Amendment protection and, thus, can
provide a basis for congressional regulation, criminal prosecution, and civil
suit. The repurposed speech scale offers a judicial operationalization to
balance national security interests with creating a robust marketplace of
ideas in informational speech. The approach also eliminates the confusion
arising from the early code speech cases where code speech in different
physical formats was analyzed differently: the repurposed speech scale is a
context-sensitive approach that is simultaneously technology neutral.
Because of this technology neutrality, the repurposed speech scale also
removes the thorny question of medium-specific analysis for instructional
or informational speech, while avoiding technology exceptionalism.
In closing, let us return a final time to the story of Jack and the
jackpot. Notably, the story is the epitome of successful vulnerability
speech: a reasonable researcher found flaws that would hurt consumers,
and he then interacted with a reasonable company to correct flaws in a
manner that minimized likely harm. While on its face, Jack’s conference
presentation would have triggered concerns over whether the speech
facilitates criminality and potentially falls outside the First Amendment,
behind the scenes, Jack’s conduct demonstrated that his motivations were
demonstrably otherwise: he and his employer cooperated with the code’s
author to correct flaws that would inevitably harm (or might have even
already harmed) consumers. Applying the analytical lens of the repurposed
speech scale, Jack’s vulnerability speech would squarely fall into protected
territory. His express goal was to improve security in the ATM industry.
He engaged in his vulnerability speech at leading information security
conferences, which were covered extensively by the mainstream press. He
possesses esoteric, specialized knowledge regarding the craft of
information security that led him to the discovery of the vulnerabilities,
which he shared with the public. Finally, he engaged in reasonable risk
mitigation strategies by cooperating with the ATM company as they
patched the vulnerable code prior to his vulnerability speech, conscious that
not only would his speech occur on a stage in Las Vegas, but also reside on
YouTube in perpetuity. What happens in Vegas never stays in Vegas in the
world of information security.
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